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HOSPITALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY
ILL IN WISCONSIN:
A NEED FOR A REEXAMINATION*
GEORGE E. Dix**
Public institutional care of the mentally ill is a problem of significant
size in Wisconsin. At the end of April, 1966, 13,192 patients were
hospitalized in state and county mental institutions, while 742 others
were on conditional leave from these facilities.' During the year ending
June 30, 1965, 2,803 patients were admitted to these facilities under
"voluntary admissions" while 4,764 were received under various forms
of involuntary admission.2 It is evident that the admission and retention
in public mental health facilities touches a large portion of the state's
population; the legal implications of the process, then, are subjects of
personal concern to a large number of the state's residents.
It has, for several reasons, become apparent that the time is ripe
*The concern here will be only with admissions to mental hospitals in a civil
context. This is not to imply that important problems are not presented where
mental illness arises in a criminal context; such matters are, however, beyond
the scope of this paper.
**B.S., University of Wisconsin, 1964; J. D., University of Wisconsin, 1966;
Law Clerk for the Hon. John C. Godbold, U. S. Court of Appeals (5th Cir.),
1966-1967; Visiting Assistant Professor of Law and Social Work, Washington
University Law School.
The resesarch for this paper was done while the author was employed as
a professional assistant by the Comprehensive Mental Health and 'ental
Retardation Planning Program of the Wisconsin Department of Public Wel-
fare. Much of the information used herein was obtained in personal interviews
with medical and judicial personnel directly involved in the hospitalization
process. Opinions expressed in this paper do not, of course, represent the views
of the state agency or anyone affiliated with it.
'State Dep't. of Public Welfare, Monthly Population Report of State and
County Mental Institutions (April, 1966). Wisconsin is one of the few states
with a dual system of mental health facilities, one on the county level, the
other on a state basis. County hospitals have traditionally been largely custodial
and for "chronic cases"; the state institutions, Mendota State Hospital (here-
inafter MSH) and Winnebago State Hospital (WSH) have been the primary
treatment facilities. For the development of the Wisconsin "county care"
system, see DEUTScHE, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AmmEucA, 262-67 (1949). For a
detailed discussion of the development of Wisconsin mental institutions, see
Hardy, Mental Hygiene Institutions (unpublished paper prepared for the
Wisconsin Legislative Council, March, 1956, on file in the Legislative Reference
Library, Madison, Wisconsin). As the county institutions obtain better facilities
and staffs, this difference between the state and county hospitals is becoming
less meaningful.
2 State Dep't. of Public Welfare, 1965 Annual Population Report-Mental Insti-
tutions, Table 2 STAnsaricAL BULLErIN MH 40, Dec. 22, 1965. For a more de-
tailed breakdown of admissions for the years 1960 through 1965, see the
appendix.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
for a thorough revision of the existing Wisconsin statutory provisions
dealing with the hospitalization of the mentally ill. First, the basic
features of the present statutory scheme were formulated in 1897.3
Continuing changes in attitude and knowledge regarding mental illness4
3 See note 7, infra.
4 Perhaps the most significant change has been the realization that the "need"
for hospitalization is not necessarily based only on a pathological condition of
the individual but also on friction between the individual and his environment
which may be "caused" as much by environmental factors as by illness of the
individual:
The traditional notion has been that a person comes to a [mental]
hospital because he is sick, mentally ill ... or, in another interpretation,
he is involuntarily committed to a hospital because persons around him
consider him psychotic, dangerous to himself or others, or in need of
hospital care even though he does not acknowledge this himself.
Recently . .. it has been suggested ... that patients are entering and
leaving mental hospitals not on the basis of amount of psychopathology
or change in mental illness alone, but rather in response to the ebb and
and flow of acceptance and toleration in their own family and community,
the availability of a particular role in the family and the nature of
their social group or class.
Mahren, The Psychodynamics of Psychiatric Hospitalization, 135 J. OF NEavous
AND MENTAL DISEASES, 354 (1962). See also Breggin, Book Review, 141 J. OF
NERvoUS AND MENTAL DISEASES, 388 (1965). Those behavior characteristics
that in practice lead to hospitalization may have only an indirect causal rela-
tionship to the mental illness. Mechanic, Therapeutic Intervention: Issues in
the Care of the Mentally Ill, 37 Am. J. OF ORTHoPsYcHiATY 703, 706 (1967)
points out:
[Much] of the disability suffered by [mental] patients is not necessarily
the result of the natural history of illness itself, but it is often a conse-
quence of the manner in which the patient has been dealt with by
associates, treatment personnel and the community. . . . [T]he factors
producing psychiatric disorders may be very different from those which
lead to social intervention and care.
One commentator has gone so far as to deny the existence of "mental illness"
as a medical fact. What is regarded as "mental illness," he argues, is actually
no more than behavior deviation from a norm which must be defined in ethical
rather than medical terms. SZAZ, LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY, 14-15 (1963).
But compare Ausubel, Personality Disorder Is Disease, MENTAL ILLNESS AND
SOCIAL PROCESSES (Scheff ed. 1967).
Contemporary sociologists tend to avoid the problem. They acknowledge
(or at least do not challenge) that a legitimate "medical" concept of mental
illness based on a theory of pathology (i.e., the unconscious response of the
personality to anxiety and tension) exists and that medical personnel attempt
to differentiate the "mentally ill" from the rest of the population on the
basis of symptoms which they reasonably theorize arise from this pathological
condition. But, the sociologists argue, as a practical matter it is a different
definition of "mental illness"-that applied by the individual's family, his
associates and he himself-which determines for most purposes whether he is
treated as being "mentally ill." This non-medical definition is based primarily
on the appropriateness of the person's behavior-whether he responds to
situations and other persons in a manner which the family, the associates or
the person himself deem appropriate (or "right" or "convenient")-and there
is no attempt made to causally relate the behavior to any pathological condi-
tion. In many cases where an individual has been "diagnosed" as "mentally
ill" by his family or associates, he is rejected by them as "sick" and "in need
of hospitalization." He can thus be turned away by mental health facilities
only to face an outside world in which he no longer has any place. For obvious
humanitarian reasons he is often absorbed into the hospital system with little
regard for whether he meets the medical criteria. Where this absorption is
accomplished by civil commitment, it is argued, both courts and medical per-
sonnel tend to ignore the failure of the patient to meet the medical criteria
because of the absence of any other solution to his problem. But this means
that full-time mental hospitals accommodate many that the community has
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suggest that procedures and criteria developed under ideas of nearly
seventy years ago should be periodically reexamined in light of subse-
quent developments. Moreover, the fact that the statutory scheme is, in
practice, often not followed suggests that it no longer corresponds to
the practical needs related to the problem of hospital treatment of the
mentally ill. The need for a reexamination of the matter is also sup-
ported by the fact that a number of jurisdictions have recently reworked
their own provisions dealing with the subject.5
While the treatment of mental illness is a medical problem properly
entrusted in large part to those with expertise and training in the area,
the decision to permit the medical treatment experts to invoke the
coercive power of the law to compel their patients to undergo treatment
involves the weighing of a prospective patient's medical "right to treat-
ment"6 against rights essentially legal in nature: his right to freedom
of choice and to a procedure designed to accurately determine the factual
justification for invoking legal coercion. A reexamination of the statu-
diagnosed as "mentally ill" but who do not meet medical criteria of "mentally
ill." For these-often the aged, the indigent and others who for various reasons
can collectively be described as the "unwanted"-the hospital serves little more
than a custodial function. See generally Mechanic, Some Factors in Identi-
fying and Defining Mental Illness, MENTAL ILLNESS AND SOCIAL PROCESSES
(Scheff ed. 1967).
One result of this more sophisticated view of the dynamics of mental
illness has been an emphasis on community education in an attempt to encour-
age the early identification of those who are "medically" mentally ill and to
stimulate development of alternative methods of meeting the needs of the
"unwanted" who do not meet medical definitions of mental illness. Another
result-and one more important for our purposes-has been a shift in the
emphasis in treatment provided for those already identified (often under non-
medical criteria) as mentally ill. Clinical means of treatment have been sup-
plemented by programs designed to assist a person diagnosed as mentally ill
in adjusting to his environment. Out-patient clinics, night or day hospitals (in
which the individual functions in the community for a portion of the day)
and similar facilities are being used to provide what is closely akin to social
casework assistance. See generally, e.g., Gorwitz, Changing Patterns in Psy-
chiatric Care in Maryland, PsYcHIra Ic RESEARCH REPORTS OF THE AM.
PSYCHIATRIC AsSN., PsYcHIATRIC EPIDIMOLOGY AND MENTAL HEALTH PLAN-
XING (Monroe, Klee and Brody ed. 1967).
5 New York (L. 1964, ch. 738) ; Illinois (L. 1963, p. 1645) ; District of Columbia
Act of Sept. 15, 1964, Pub. L. 88-597, 78 Stat. 944 (Pub. L. 88-597, 78 Stat.
944, Sept. 15, 1964) ; Minnesota (L. 1967, ch. 638). See also Note, The Needfor Reform in the California Civil Commitment Procedure, 19 STAN. L. REv.
992 (1967) discussing the far-reaching recommendations of the Subcommittee
on Mental Health Services of the California State Legislature, and the report
of the Legal Studies Unit of the Massachusetts Special Commission on Mental
Health, Kenefick, et. al., The Massachusetts Commitment and Hospitalization
Laws for the Mentally Ill: Analysis and Proposals for Change, 2 PORTIA L. J.
19 (1967). It is not likely that the statutory revisions have-or that they will-
No attempt will be made here to duplicate the survey of statutory pro-
visions by the American Bar Foundation in, THE MENTALLY DISA3LED AND
THE LAW (Lindeman and McIntyre ed. 1961), which contains an exhaustive
discussion of the Draft Act for the Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill and
all state statutes. For another classical discussion, see Ross, Commitment of
the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MICH. L. REv. 945 (1959).
6 Stating that a mentally ill person has a "right to treatment" in the absence
of his recognition of the need for it assumes the legitimacy and desirability
of the exercise of the state's parens patriae power. But this statement of the
problem-and its implications-may be misleading; see text at page ..... infra.
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tory provisions, then, is only in part a medical problem. The purpose
of this article is to examine a number of problems related to the hos-
pitalization of the mentally ill as to which no satisfactory solution can
be achieved without a consolidation of legal and medical knowledge and
values.
I. PRESENT WISCONSIN STATUTORY SCHEMEE
7
The basic procedure contemplated by the present statutory provisions
can be summarized briefly. A petition for a judicial inquiry into a pros-
pective patient's mental condition is filed with the county court by three
7 In the period immediately after statehood, the county judge had care and
custody of all insane persons and was directed to "provide for their safekeep-
ing and maintainance." Wis. STAT. §63 (1848). In 1858, the county judge was
authorized (if "public safety" so required) on the petition of a local govern-
mental unit to require the sheriff to confine any insane person in a "proper
place" where he was to receive "such care, attention and treatment as the judge
may deem proper and necessary." Wis. Laws 1858, ch. 71.
In anticipation of the opening of the first state mental hospital (the insane
had previously been cared for in county almshouses or "poorhouses"; see note
34, infra) the following year, the legislature in 1859 provided for admission
to the new facility upon the certification of a "respectable physician" that he
had examined the prospective patient and found him insane. The right to
habeas corpus was expressly preserved and in such proceedings the issue of
sanity was to be determined by the court after a hearing. Wis. Laws 1859,
ch. 218.
A provision apparently for voluntary admissions was enacted in 1860,
authorizing such admissions upon the recommendation of two physicians. Wis.
Laws 1860, ch. 263 sec. 12.
In 1871 a somewhat more complex procedure was prescribed. Upon receipt
of information that there were "insane persons within the county needing
care and treatment," the county judge was authorized to have the sheriff
summon two physicians to examine the persons. Although this is not entirely
clear, the statute apparently intended an independent evaluation by the court
of the justification for commitment. Wis. Laws 1871, ch. 82. This ambiguity
was cleared up in 1878 when the examining physicians were directed to "certify
the results" of their examination to the judge, who "after such further inquiry
as he shall deem just and necessary" was to determine the issue of sanity. Wis.
Laws 1878, ch. 32.
This procedure was apparently an alternative to that contained in Wis.
Laws 1872, ch. 176 which provided for admission on the written request of the
patient's friends, relatives or guardian plus a certification by two physicians.
No independent judicial action was required.
In 1897 the statutory provisions underwent a thorough revision; the result
was essentially the scheme that exists today. Provisions for involuntary admis-
sion without judicial action were eliminated. After application to the court had
been made, the prospective patient could demand a jury trial (but only if a
reasonable doubt as to insanity existed). Before commitment, a finding by
either the court or a jury that the individual was insane and "a fit subject
to be sent to the hospital or asylum for the insane" was required. Specific
provision was made for observational detention for the time necessary to
"afford sufficient opportunity to determine the necessity of committing such
person." Wis. Laws 1897, ch. 319.
Specific provision for "voluntary admission" was also made. Such an ad-
mission required a certificate to two physicians and was to be at the discretion
of the hospital superintendent. Five days' notice was required before the patient
had a legal right to leave the institution, Wis. Laws 1897, ch. 263 sec. 8.
An extensive revision of a "housekeeping nature" was made in 1947, but
no fundamental changes in procedure or substance were made. Wis. Laws
1947, ch. 485. See generally Comments of Interim Committee, 1960 Wis. Ann.
at 318.
Statutory provisions for hospitalization, then, became more precise as
facilities for the mentally ill became available. Although the early provisions
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persons, one of whom must bear a close relationship to the prospective
patient." The court then appoints two physicians, one a psychiatrist, to
examine the patient. 9 The physicians conduct the examination, "satisfy
themselves as to his mental condition and make a written report."'1
For purposes of the examination, the court may compel the subject to
be present at a specified time and place.:" A time is then set for a
hearing and notice of this is served on the patient.' 2 A judicial hearing
is held; its significance is explained to the patient" and a guardian ad
litem may be appointed for him.' 4 If notice is given in advance, the
patient may "examine" the physicians ;15 he may also demand a jury
trial."' The court (or the jury, if one is demanded) determines whether
the prospective patient "is mentally ill and should be sent to a hospital
for the mentally ill.' x If it is determined that he meets these two criteria,
the court then formally commits 18 him to a state hospital or, if his illness
is diagnosed as chronic, to a county hospital.' 9
The statutes also provide for a number of variations in this pro-
cedure, although the overall scheme clearly contemplates that the varia-
tions are to be used only in exceptional situations where a specific justi-
fication for abandoning the normal procedure exists.
A prospective patient who is "irresponsible and dangerous to himself
or others" may be detained by a law enforcement officer for five days
simply on the application of one physician and two other individuals; a
judicial proceeding must be initiated as soon as possible.20 Or, if "safety
requires it," a court may order a prospective patient detained up to ten
required independent court action only if habeas corpus was brought, since 1897
the courts have had the responsibility of making an independent evaluation
of the justification for hospitalization in all cases. The vague "fit subject"
criteria has remained substantially unchanged since 1897.8Wis. STAT. §51.01(1) (1965).
9 Wis. STAT. §51.01(2) (1965).
10 Wis. STAT. §51.01(2)(b) (1965). The form for the report, set out in the
statute, is in summary terms. Wis. STAT. §51.01(4) (1965).
"Wis. STAT. §51.01(2) (a) (1965).
12 WIS. STAT. §51.02(1) (a) (1965). The court has discretionary authority to have
notice served on "such other persons as it deems advisable." It may also issue
an attachment of the person to compel the patient's attendance at the hearing.
WIS. STAT. §51.02(1)(a) (1965).
3WIs. STAT. §51.02(2) (1965).
'1Wis. STAT. §51.02(4) (1965).
5 WIS. STAT. §51.02(1) (1965).
16 WIS. STAT. §51.03 (1965).
17 WIS. STAT. §51.05(1) (1965).
28 Mental health personnel argue that the term "commitment" should be aban-
doned in favor of a term with less of a criminal flavor, such as "involuntary
hospitalization." The danger is that by giving the process a benign label, the
fact that it represents a significant deprivation of liberty may be obscured.
Here "commitment" will be used interchangeably with "involuntary hospitaliza-
tion."
19 WIS. STAT. §51.05(2) (1965). The same procedural sections are used for de-
termination of mental infirmity (usually senility) and mental deficiency (but
see alternative procedure, Wis. STAT. §51.065 (1965). This undoubtedly causes
some confusion between "mental illness" and other afflictions for which
institutionalization may be obtained.
2oWIs. STAT. §51.04(1) (1965).
1967]
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days pending a judicial hearing.21 Both provisions are obviously designed
to permit pre-hearing detention of an individual who is potentially
dangerous to himself or others.
If no psychiatrist is available to assist in the medical examination,
two "reputable" physicians may conduct the pre-hearing examination.
22
After the report of the examiners has been received, but before the
hearing, the court may order the patient detained in a "designated
institution" for up to thirty days; upon application, this may be ex-
tended to ninety days.2 3 When this is to be done is not made clear by
the statute, but the overall scheme clearly implies that the provision is
to be used only in unusual situations where the pre-hearing examination
is inconclusive. Where the provision is invoked, there is no formal op-
portunity for the patient to protest his confinement before the end of
the ninety-day period.
Notice of the hearing need not be given to the patient if "it appears
to the satisfaction of the court that the notice would be injurious or
without advantage to the patient by reason of his mental condition. '24
The patient himself need not be present at the hearing ;25 the criteria
for excusing his presence is not spelled out, but it is reasonable to
assume that his attendance may be excused if the court is convinced
that his presence would be useless or injurious because of his mental
condition.
Finally, if after the hearing the judge is still in doubt as to the
patient's mental condition, he may, before deciding whether the patient
should be committed, order him detained for up to ninety days for
"medical observation. ' 26 During this time, treatment may be adminis-
tered if the superintendent of the hospital believes it necessary.2 7
A patient may also be admitted to a mental hospital on a "voluntary"
basis. A superintendent may, at his discretion, admit any person who
requests admission and presents a certificate of one physician, based on
personal examination, supporting the person's claim that he is suffering
21 WIS, STAT. §51.04(2) (1965). In addition, if a patient is "brought to or applies
for admission to" a hospital without a commitment or a voluntary application
or under a "void or irregular" commitment or application, he may be detained
by the superintendent for no more than ten days for the purpose of procuring
a valid commitment or application or "for observation." If the superintendent
decides the patient needs hospitalization, he may himself begin involuntary
commitment proceedings. Wis. Stat. §51.05(4) (1965). This broad authority
would permit the development of a practice whereby ten day hospitalization
could be routinely accomplished with no judicial intervention whatsoever; there
is some indication that it has been so used.
22WIs. STAT. §51.01(2) (a) (1965).
23 WIS. STAT. §51.04(3) (1965).
24Wis. STAT. §51.02(1)(a) (1965). The commitment is to show whether notice
was in fact served and, if no such service was made, the reason for the
failure to do so. Wis. Stat. §51.05(1) (1965).
25 WiS. STAT. §51.02 (1965). If the patient is not present, however, the court must
personally observe him.
26 Wis. STAT. §51.02(5) (b) (1965).
27 WIs. STAT. §51.04(5) (1965).
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from mental illness. 2 The patient admitted under this provision is to be
released five days after he gives notice of an intention to leave.29 If,
however, the superintendent believes the patient needs further hospital-
ization, he may detain him up to thirty-five days during which time
involuntary commitment proceedings may be begun.30
Once hospitalized under an indeterminate commitment, a patient
may secure release in only two ways. The superintendent of the hospital
may grant him a "conditional release." During the year following such
release the patient may be summarily returned if "it becomes unsafe
or improper to allow him to remain at large."3' 1 (The superintendent
of a state hospital may, with the approval of the Department of Public
Welfare, also unconditionally release a patient.) 32 In the alternative, a
patient (or a friend or relative) may petition the court for a re-
examination.3 3 The procedure followed is much like that of the original
commitment: an examination by two physicians is conducted, notice is
given, a hearing is held (and a jury is available). A judicial determina-
tion is then made of the propriety of further detention. A patient is en-
titled to one re-examination per year as of right but the court may in
its discretion order one at any time.34
28WIs. STAT. §51.10(1) (1965). Some screening is performed in the exercise of
this authority. The superintendent of one state institution indicated that if the
patient was an inebriate (special provisions for the admission of alcoholics
appear in Wis. STAT. §51.09 (1965), if he was trying to avoid criminal liability
or if he had been misled as to the consequences of admitting himself, the re-
quest for a voluntary admission would be refused. Only if a patient was
"grossly incompetent" would he be refused admission on grounds of his in-
capacity to surrender his future liberty. At any stage of the involuntary pro-
ceeding, a prospective involuntary patient may become a voluntary patient by
signing an application for voluntary admission in the presence of the judge.
Wis. Stat. §51.10(4) (1965).
29WIs. STAT. §51.10(2) (1965).
so Ibid. There is some indication that the state institutions begin commitment
proceedings to retain a voluntary patient who gives notice of his intention
to leave only if the patient is considered "dangerous." There is no proof that
this is uniformly observed, nor are there any safeguards against its misapplica-
tion in a specific case.
A patient may also be admitted as a transfer from a correctional institution;
see appendix. This presents special problems beyond our concern here. See
Comment, 50 MARQ. L. REv. 120 (1966).3 1 WIs. STAT. §51.13(1) (1965).
32WIs. STAT. §51.12(4) (1965).
33 WIS. STAT. §51.11(1) (1965).
34 It is undoubtedly true that in Wisconsin as elsewhere the elaborate safeguards
surrounding involuntary hospitalization are partially traceable to the custodial
nature and atrocious conditions of early institutional facilities for the men-
tally ill. In 1870, for example, although the State Hospital for the Insane had
300 patients, many of the mentally ill were still being "cared for" in county
almshouses or poorhouses, along with the epileptics, blind, mentally deficient
and other social misfits. The State Board of Charities and Reform made the
following report concerning the Dane County Poor House:
One insane woman was confined with a chain in the room with the
female paupers. . . . Two insane men were confined in a building,
erected for the purpose, adjoining the wood house, and a little distant
from the main building. One of the men is demented, and remains in
his cell all the time simply covered with a blanket. The other is badly
19671
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II. PRESENT PRACTICE IN HOSPITALIZATION PROCEEDINGS
While the precise extent to which the statutory scheme is observed
in practice is a matter of dispute, it is clear that in a significant number
of cases the basic procedure is not followed.3 . In some situations the
statutory "exceptions" have become the general practice; in others no
statutory justification whatsoever for routine practices can be found.
Although the statutory scheme apparently contemplates that the
county court will usually be the initial official agency coming into contact
with a potential patient, this may be true in practice. In many cases,
the behavioral symptoms are such that the police are the first official
agency to come into contact with the prospective patient; this fact raises
troublesome questions as to the willingness and ability of law enforce-
ment agencies to rapidly identify the mentally ill and to present them
to a proper facility for treatment.3 6 In other cases, help may initially be
deformed, his knees being drawn up to his chin and his limbs stiff in
that position. He has no clothing other than a blanket thrown over him.
1870 REPORT OF THE STATE BOARD OF CHARITIES AND REFORM 61 (1870).
Where the facilities have been transformed from custodial to treatment
institutions and physical conditions have been improved, however, the result
of an unjustified commitment is less burdensome. The patient is unlikely to
be retained for a long period if he does not in fact meet the criteria, and his
confinement is not as unpleasant as it would have been in earlier years.
Procedural safeguards developed when the above conditions were prevalent
may, therefore, no longer be reasonable in light of the risks presently involved.
Yet despite the improvements, ex-patients regard their stay in the institu-
tions with little favor. Miller, et al., Afterinatl--The Community Readjustment
of Post-Hospital Mental Patients, 40 PSYCHIATRIC QUARTERLY SUPPLEMENT 244,
252 (1966) reported that when patients were interviewed eight years after
their release from such institutions, nearly one-third indicated that hospitaliza-
tion was either a harmful or a negative experience; only one-fourth regarded
it as therapeutic or helpful. Despite modern facilities and treatment techniques,
it seems clear that hospitalization in a mental facility is generally regarded
as less beneficial and more uncomfortable than a stay in a facility for treat-
ment of a physical illness.
3- Accurate field data on commitment procedures is difficult to obtain. Extensive
field research on commitment procedures in Wisconsin has been done by
Thomas J. Sheff under a grant from the State Mental Health Advisory Com-
mittee, but his results and conclusions are not available in final form. But
see Sheff, The Societal Reaction to Deviance, 11 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 401 (1964),
based on research in an unidentified "midwestern state," concluding that pre-
hospitalization screening by medical examiners and courts is "usually pre-
functory." Janopaul, Problems in Hospitalizing the Mentally Ill (no. 31,
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH MEMORANDUM SERIES, 1962) describes
the extensive field studies conducted in seven states by the American Bar
foundation; no published final report of this project is available. Miller and
Schwartz, County Lunacy Commission Hearings: Some Observations of Com-
initmnents to a State Mental Hospital, 14 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 26 (1967) critically
discusses procedures observed in an unidentified state (probably California).
3; A recent study reported that over 76 percent of a sample of Negro male
patients in a Baltimore state hospital had arrived at the institution through
the police and the city jail; the report indicated that the police agencies had
failed to recognize pre-existing mental illness of these patients despite frequent
earlier contacts with them. Brody, Derbyshire and Schliefer, How the Young
Adult Baltimore Negro Male Becomes a Maryland Mental Hospital Statistic,
in Psychiatric Research Reports of the Am. Psychiatric Asso., PSYCHIATRIC
EPIDEMIOLOGY AND MENTAL HEALTH PLANNING (Monroe, Klee and Brody, ed.,
1967). But the sword cuts two ways. While there is the danger that law en-
forcement agencies will not recognize an individual's need for mental treatment
and thereby delay treatment, well-meaning police officers may also assist in
[Vol. 51
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sought from nearby hospitals; in at least one county, current practice
is to detain patients brought directly to the hospital for a significant time
before any judicial action whatsoever is taken (or sought) .3
In a number of counties, pre-hearing detention has become standard
practice through the issuance of an order for detention whenever an
application is filed. Often the patient is held in a local hospital, but in
some cases a jail is used. In most cases, this pre-hearing detention is
relatively short, often approximately a week or ten days.
The medical examination also differs from county to county. Es-
pecially in predominantly rural areas, physicians with formal psychiatric
training are often not available, but in some cases even where trained
psychiatrists are available they are not used. The reliability of an exam-
ination by one without formal training in the mental health field is, of
course, open to severe question. The actual examination itself is some-
times brief and cursory; it may be conducted in the judge's chambers
at the time of the hearing itself. (Where the patient is being detained in
a hospital, the examination is likely to consist of a number of interviews
conducted by a psychiatrist and in some cases also by a social worker
or other hospital staff member.) But it seems clear that in a number of
cases, the medical examination cannot be regarded as providing the
court with a careful and reliable evaluation of the need for long-term
hospitalization.
The procedure followed in the hearing itself is a little more consis-
tent. Pre-hearing notice is sometimes routinely omitted or may consist
of no more than service of a formal document, a process apt to mean
little to a confused and disturbed individual. The hearing itself varies
in degree of formality and location. In some counties it is held in the
courtroom with the judge on the bench, while in others (especially where
the patient has been detained prior to hearing), it is an informal con-
sultation at the hospital, perhaps even in the patient's room. Often a
procedure of intermediate formality-a hearing in chambers-is con-
ducted. A guardian ad litem may be appointed only infrequently or if
appointed, may make only a perfunctory appearance.
Seldom is any meaningful challenge made to the conclusions of the
medical examiners. The physicians may not be present at the hearing-
the judge may have only a report phrased in terms of conclusions. The
unnecessary hospitalization. See Yelk v. Seefeldt, 35 Wis.2d 271, 151 N.W.2d 4(1967), where two police officers who had arrested a wife after responding
to a domestic disturbance call signed applications for an inquiry at the urging
of the husband and his pastor; only after several days of hospitalization was
it determined that the wife was not in fact mentally ill.
37 The simple matter of getting information as to the procedure for obtaining
treatment for the mentally ill may be extremely difficult. See the experience
of the American Bar Foundation researcher who was unable to obtain a
coherent description of the available alternative procedures despite telephone
calls to the police, a hospital emergency service and a hospital psychiatric
receiving center. Janopaul, Problems in Hospitalizing the Mentally Ill, p. 8-9(No. 31, AmERIcAN BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH MEMORANDUM SERIES, 1962).
19671
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
patient almost never has contradictory medical testimony, and the
guardian seldom provides vigorous cross examination of the court ap-
pointed examiners. In some cases, then, the hearing may become merely
a rubber stamp of the medical examiners' conclusion and therefore be
of little functional value. 38
The absence of a meaningful pre-hearing medical evaluation of the
need for long-term hospitalization may be partially offset by routine
use of the observational commitment: a patient may be routinely sent
to a mental hospital on a thirty-to-ninety day "observational commit-
ment." Where this is done, the hospital's recommendation as to the
need for further hospitalization, i.e., an indeterminate commitment, may
be followed without any formal opportunity for the patient to respond.
Once an indeterminate commitment has been made, a patient may
be unaware of-or unable to effectively implement-his right to periodic
redeterminations of the justification for his retention. If released con-
ditionally, he may be returned to the hospital without effective oppor-
tunity to question the legitimacy of the action.
This is not the place to evaluate these questionable practices. To the
extent that they occur, they may offend values to which legally-trained
individuals are particularly sensitive. But they may also represent a
necessary accommodation to local conditions and facilities. The fact
that the practices find no justification in the present statutory provisions
suggests that both the practices and the statutes should be carefully
examined. A convenient way to lay the groundwork for such an
examination is to investigate the alternatives to the existing statutory
provisions.
III. POTENTIAL CHANGES IN THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
To the extent that present statutory provisions and actual practices
do not correspond to modern medical knowledge or do not strike an
acceptable balance between the right to individual freedom and the
necessity of providing proper treatment, a change in either the statutes
or the practice-or perhaps both-is indicated.
Some potential changes can be given onlyf passing mention here.
Thus, the recently enacted definition of "mental illness," 3 9 which uses
38 The statutory right to a jury determination is almost never exercised. There
is, in fact, some indication that if a patient requests a jury proceeding, active
steps are taken to prevent his following through. One judge suggested that
when such a demand is made, an attorney is appointed and the attorney
manages to "work things out" without a jury trial. This illusory right to invoke
the protection of the jury has such strong emotional roots, however, that asa practical matter its elimination is an impossibility. For that reason, theissue will be given no more attention here.
3 The new definition was enacted as part of the Interstate Compact on Mental
Health. Wis. Laws 1965, ch. 611, sec. 1. This repealed the old definition, ob-
viously antiquated, which equated mental illness with insanity, defined, in
turn, as including "every idiot, non compos, lunatic and distracted person."
WIs. STAT. §990.01(16) (1965). It substituted, for purposes of Chapter 51,
the definition contained in the Interstate Compact:
"'Mental illness' means mental disease to such extent that a person so
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only the conclusory term "mental disease" to describe the requisite
mental condition but continues to attempt to define mental illness in
terms of need for treatment, may be more confusing than helpful.40
The presumption of incompetency raised by hospitalization 1 (whether
voluntary or not) which continues through the period of conditional
release has, the authorities agree, little basis in fact and often constitutes
a serious inconvenience for patients and their families 2
There are a number of matters, however, which demand more ex-
tensive discussion.
True Voluntary Admission Procedure
Under the present provisions there is no way by which a patient
may be received in a mental hospital on a truly voluntary basis, i.e.,
where he may be assured of the legal right to leave when and if he
desired to do so. There are a number of arguments in favor of the
availability of such a procedure. The coercive aspects of admission to
a mental hospital under the present provisions may deter some who
would otherwise voluntarily seek institutional help--the availability of
institutional care without the aura of legal coercion would encourage
afflicted requires care and treatment for his own welfare, or the welfare
of others, or of the community."
Wis. STAT. §51.001(1) (1967).40 Whether or not so intended, this definition tends to confuse the criteria for
involuntary hospitalization. Under existing statutory criteria, an individual is
subject to involuntary hospitalization if he is "mentally ill" and "a proper
subject for custody and treatment." Yet under the newly-enacted definition of
mental illness, he is not mentally ill unless he is so afflicted with "mental
disease" that he "requires care and treatment for his own welfare, or the wel-
fare of others, or of the community." There is significant doubt that a mean-
ingful definition of "mental illness" can be drafted for statutory purposes.
Compare Weihofen, The Definition of Mental Illness, 21 OHIO ST. L. J. 1(1960) with Schwartz, "Mental Disease": The Groundwork Legal Analysis and
Legislative Action, 111 U. PA. L. R-v. 389 (1963). The same definitional
problem creates difficulties in the formulation and administration of the
defense of non-responsibility in the criminal arena. See, e.g., Livermore and
Meehl, The Virtues of M'Naghten, 51 MINN. L. REv. 789, 825-29 (1967). But
it is clear that whether a person is "mentally ill" is a far different question
from whether the effects of his illness are such as to justify requiring him
to undergo treatment and perhaps full-time hospitalization. Weihofen, supra
at 2.
It may be that whether an individual is so afflicted with mental disease
that he requires care and treatment is a different inquiry than whether he
is a proper subject for custody and treatment. An individual could require
treatment for his own welfare yet it might not be necessary that the treatment
be administered while he remains in custody. But the existing statutory pro-
visions are confusing and it would seem that if no meaningful medical
definition of mental illness can be drafted, the definition is best left vague;
eligibility for voluntary and compulsory forms of treatment should explicitly
be set out in proximity to the statutory provisions dealing with the specific
treatment facilities rather than in the definitional section.4 1 WIs. STAT. §51.005(2) (1965).
42 E.g., Crawfis, Discharge from State Hospital in Relation to Comnpetency, 113
AM. J. PsycHiATRy 448 (1956); Mezer and Rheingold, Mental Capacity and
Incompetency: A Psycho-Legal Problem, 118 Am. J. PsYcHiATRY 827 (1962).
But see Ross, supra note 5 at 944 who characterizes the Wisconsin presumption(if modified so as not to apply to a patient on conditional release) as the "best
answer."
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these individuals to seek help at an early stage of their illness. Moreover,
the present "voluntary" procedure as applied to some individuals is
constitutionally suspect: if a patient is in fact incompetent, he may well
lack the capacity to "contract away" his liberty by voluntarily admitting
himself and thereby surrendering for up to thirty-five days the right
to release.43 If this is true, the only method by which institutional care
43 In Ex Parte Romero, 51 N.M. 201, 181 P.2d 811 (1947) the petitioner had
signed a written application for voluntary admission. The statute authorized
the hospital to detain a voluntary patient not more than ten days after notice
in writing of intent to leave was given. When the hospital refused to release
him immediately after he gave oral notice of intent to leave, petitioner brought
habeas corpus. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that the voluntary ad-
mission statute (and another statute permitting hospitals to detain persons for
thirty days upon the certificate of one physician that immediate institutional
care was required) violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Con-
stitution and Art. 2, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution. Responding
to the hospital's assertion that by applying for admission the petitioner had
contracted to remain for ten days after written notice, the court declared:
"Obviously, it does not require citation of authority that one may
not enforce such a contract made with a person he knows to be so dis-
ordered in mind as to require treatment in an institution for the treatment
of mental diseases."
51 N.M. at 204, 181 P.2d at 813. Section 71 of the New York Mental Hygiene
Law, which provides for voluntary admissions pursuant to which a patient
may be detained for ten days after giving notice of intent to leave (see text
at note 45, infra) has come under attack by several lower New York courts.
Section 71(5) specifically provides that "no requirement shall be made . . . as
a condition to admission and retention . . . that any person applying for ad-
mission shall have the legal capacity to contract." In People ex rel Kaminstein
v. Brooklyn State Hospital, 49 Misc.2d 57, 266 N.Y.S.2d 916, 922-23 (Supreme
Court, 1966) the court commented:[Section 71] assumes that although a mentally ill patient may lack
legal capacity to contract, he nevertheless has the legal capacity to
agree to deprive himself, by agreement with the hospital authorities,
of the rights which are accorded to "involuntary" patients.
It is, of course, familiar law that mental incapacity . . . will avoid
a contract for lack of consent. But in cases other than those involving
contract, the act of one mentally ill may also be disaffirmed, i.e., an act
of retirement from the public school system while mentally incompetent
[citation omitted]; a wife's abandonment of the husband [citation
omitted] ; an attempted marriage by one mentally incapacitated [citation
omitted].
... [Since a person admitted and detained as mentally ill is unable
to make sound judgments, the law should be especially solicitious for
his welfare and not, as here, encourage its officials to induce or beguile
such a patient, in the midst of his confusion and agony, to make judg-
ments of doubtful integrity.
... [The voluntary status] is directly contrary to the whole purpose
and spirit of [the Mental Hygiene Law. It] . . . is of doubtful constitu-
tionality. The requirement that hospital officials should encourage and
induce patients to accept that unjust classification is most unworthy.
In re Buttonow, 52 Misc.2d 687, 276 N.Y.S.2d 771 (Supreme Court, 1966) set
aside the conversion of a patient from involuntary status to voluntary status
on the ground that Section 71 violated due process and equal protection. The
court took notice of the statutory directive that capacity to contract not be
required, but it observed that there is also a requirement that the patient be
"suitable and willing." This implies, the court indicated, a requirement that
the patient have at least "simple understanding." In addition, the court noted
that although a voluntary patient has a theoretical right to release on ten days'
notice of intent to leave, testimony established that if the medical staff did not
regard him as ready for release, involuntary proceedings would be begun upon
the receipt of such notice from the patient. This factor, coupled with the ab-
sence of any provision for judicial review of continued retention of the vol-
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for such individuals can legitimately be provided is through the com-
plex procedure of involuntary commitment.
In any case, the availability of a true voluntary procedure for ad-
mission would minimize the need for coercion either by encouraging a
prospective patient to seek help before he becomes so ill that he no
longer recognizes his need for treatment or by permitting his admission
without the deprivation of liberty inherent in the present alternatives.
There is also evidence which indicates that within a mental hospital,
those patients who are known to be voluntary admissions are regarded
more favorably by the staff, other patients and family members. This
may affect the patient's relationship with these individuals and ulti-
mately his response to attempts to treat his illness."4 Medical as well as
legal considerations argue in favor of the use of voluntary procedures
wherever possible.
A model for a true voluntary procedure is the New York statute
which provides for both "voluntary admissions" (pursuant to which a
patient may be detained for a limited period of time)'- and "informal
admissions" (under which a patient may leave the hospital at any time
he desires).46 The "informal admission," then, is essentially the same
as the familiar mode of entry to non-mental hospitals.
untary patient and the failure to provide for compulsory involvement by the
Mental Health Information Service in the hospitalization and retention of
voluntary patients led the court to conclude that the voluntary admission pro-
vision "in effect has established an underpriviledged class of patients [subject
to disabilities similar to those of involuntary patients but] . . . without the
protection of the law afforded to involuntary patients." 52 Misc.2d at .... ,
276 N.Y.S.2d at 775. This, it was held, constituted a violation of the rights
to due process and equal protection guaranteed by both the New York
and the federal constitutions.
The decision in Buttonow (and the dicta in Kaminstein) rested on the
factual conclusion that voluntary patients were as a practical matter subjected
to a potentially more serious deprivation of liberty than a ten day waiting
period for release and the legal conclusion that this demanded that they be
accorded more protective aspects of the Mental Hygiene Law than are presently
applied to them. In neither case did the court discuss whether enforcement
by a hospital of the ten day waiting period against a person who was mentally
ill at the time of his admission would, without more, constitute a deprivation
of liberty without due process of law. It seems clear that a number (probably
most or almost all) of voluntary patients do, at the time of admission, have
sufficient mental capacity to intelligently consider whether to submit themselves
to this procedure; but it is also likely that some do not possess capacity to
contract or the mental capacity courts have traditionally required for an
effective waiver of constitutionally guaranteed rights. The New York cases
strongly suggest that detention pursuant to such an "agreement" would, where
there is no assurance that the patient did in fact have the capacity to waive
his rights, be subject to question. The potential success of such a challenge
would be greatly reduced if the proof showed a regularized administrative
practice of screening applicants for voluntary admissions and refusing to
accept those where it appeared possible that because of family or other
pressures and/or the applicant's mental condition, the patient's action did not
meet the "legal" test for a waiver of constitutional rights.
4 Dezin and Sptizer, Patient Entry Patterns in Varied Psychiatric Settings,
50 MENTAL HYGIENE 257, 261 (1966).
4 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAw §71(1) (McKinney, 1965).
46N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §71(2) (McKinney, 1965). See also ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 91%, §4-1.
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To assure that patients in such categories are aware of their right
to leave, some states require careful explanations to the patients of their
status; New York requires that such explanations be made every 120
days.4 7
Merely inserting such a provision in the statutes will not, of course,
limit the use of involuntary methods to those cases where coercion is
absolutely necessary. Only the enthusiastic implementation of voluntary
and informal admission procedures by those working with prospective
patients (for example, county judges, family physicians and social
workers) can make the statutory provisions into an effective means of
minimizing the use of commitments.&48 But the objective of restricting
involuntary commitment to those cases where its use is absolutely neces-
sary can be recognized, and perhaps its achievement stimulated, by a
provision similar to that adopted in New York: "It shall be the duty
of all state and local officers having duties to perform relating to the
mentally ill to encourage any such person suitable therefore and in need
of hospitalization to apply for admission as provided in [the informal
and voluntary admission] ... section."'4
Procedure for Involuntary Hospitalization
It is apparent from the brief discussion above that in a number of
situations the statutory procedure for commitment is not being carefully
followed. Where it is not, any reshaping of the statutory provisions
4 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §71(4) (McKinney, 1965).48 Maximum use is not being made of the existing provisions for voluntary
admissions, imperfect though they may be. The following table contains ratios
calculated by placing the number of voluntary admissions over the number
of indeterminate commitments; in 1960, for example, Mendota State Hospital
had 2.5 voluntary admissions for every indeterminate commitment.
Table 1: Trends in Use of Voluntary Admissions
in Wisconsin Mental Hospitals-1960-1965
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
Mendota State 2.5 3.3 3.6 4.6 3.8 4.2
Hospital 1 1 1 1 1 1
Winnebago State 0.85 0.90 0.91 0.96 0.96 1.05
Hospital 1 1 1 1 1 1
Non-Milwaukee 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.38 0.53 1.10
County Hospitals 1 1 1 1 1 1
Milwaukee County is not included because the number of indeterminate com-
mitments is so small as to be negligible; see appendix.
In all three categories of institutions, the trend is towards increased use
of the voluntary admission, but the progress is uneven. By 1965, Winnebago
State Hospital lagged behind even the county institutions which have shown
rapid progress since 1963; both, however, were far outdistanced by Mendota
State Hospital. While it may be argued that the county hospitals have inade-
quate staffs to undertake the sometimes time-consuming task of encouraging
voluntary admissions and that many of what now show up as commitments
would, were such an admission available, be non-protesting admissions of
elderly and senile patients, no reason for the difference between the two state
facilities, other than a difference in effort and emphasis, appears.
49N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §71(5) (1965).
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should involve a factual investigation of the reasons for the non-
compliance and the substitution of provisions that are realistic (in the
sense that they provide for necessary accommodation to local situations
that cannot be altered by legislative mandate), but yet provide an as-
surance that a procedure meeting minimum requirements of fairness
will be followed.
Two potential changes can be discussed in detail, however, even with
the meager quantitative information available at this point.
A. Pre-hearing Detention
Especially in rural counties with limited mental health facilities, the
prevailing practice often is to have the sheriff take a prospective patient
to the county hospital as soon as an application for a judicial inquiry
into his mental condition has been filed. The patient is then detained
there until a physician (often a local psychiatrist who spends one day
per week at the hospital) conducts a thorough examination. At the time
of the hearing, the patient will almost always have been detained for a
week or more; so that even if it is determined at the hearing that com-
mitment is not warranted, the patient will have already undergone a
significant deprivation of liberty.
The formal statutory provisions invoked differ, but usually the ten-
day detention on court order (to be used, according to the terms of
the statute, if "safety requires it") is used.50 In some cases, the "safety"
requirement is completely ignored; in others, the concept of "danger-
ousness" required for detention is stretched and/or the family's
assertion that the patient needs immediate detention is uncritically
accepted by the county judge.
The practice is defended on several grounds. Many localities have
such limited psychiatric facilities that any examination by a trained
psychiatrist is allegedly impossible unless the patients are readily avail-
able at a central location during the limited time the psychiatrist is
available. Even where this is not the case, however, it is argued that
only during a period of relatively long term observaton can a reliable
50 The provision in Wis. STAT. §51.04(3) can also be used for pre-hearing deten-
tion, although by its specific terms this provision is not legitimately available
until after the examination by the court-appointed physicians. Some idea of
the extent of pre-hearing detentions can be obtained by noting the number of
"temporary detentions with court order" in the appendix.
Use of statutory provisions intended for occasional "emergency" detentions
as a means of developing a general practice of pre-hearing detention is not
unique to Wisconsin. See, e.g., Note, Hospitalization of the Mentally III in
Utah: A Practical and Legal Analysis, 1966 UTAH L. R.v. 223, 229-30 and
Grace, et. al., Screening the Mentally Ill Before Court Commitment, 16 CALI-
FORN A DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HYGIENE, 1965. But consider for comparison
the policy reflected in the TEXAS MENTAL HEALTH CODE, ART. 5547-47 (1958):
Pending the hearing on the Petition for indefinite commitment the
proposed patient may remain at liberty unless he is already a patient
in a mental hospital or is placed under protective custody.
A similar provision relates to the procedure for short-term hospitalization.
TEXAS MENTAL HEALTH CODE, ART. 5547-35 (1958).
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diagnosis on which to base the commitment decision be made.-1 By a
period of pre-hearing hospitalization, the medical staff can thoroughly
observe the patient and make a meaningful diagnosis on which the court
may confidently rely.
If these arguments are valid, there is obviously a conflict between
two present statutory directives: no patient is to be deprived of his
liberty before a judicial hearing unless there is a danger of physical
violence, and the court is to have available at the time of the hearing a
reliable medical evaluation of the prospective patient's condition. If this
conflict does exist (as seems likely), a compromise might be made by
providing that if those applying for a judicial inquiry make a "prima
facie case" for a medical need for immediate hospitalization, the court,
after making a finding that a reliable medical examination cannot be
obtained without detention of the patient, might authorize a limited
period of observational detention, to be followed by a judicial hearing
on the need for further hospitalization.
It is also argued that the limited pre-hearing detention sometimes
enables a mentally ill individual to be treated without further invoking
coercion. 52 During the period of pre-hearing detention, the medical staff
has an opportunity to persuade a patient to voluntarily admit himself.
In some cases where full time hospitalization is not necessary, judicial
proceedings are suspended on condition that the patient uses private or
public out-patient facilities.
Before the need for pre-hearing detention is accepted, however, it
might be wise to study in detail the practice which has developed in
Madison. Under this procedure, which has been reported as successful
in the majority of cases, a prospective patient is merely served with a
notice to report to a local hospital at a given time for a mental examina-
tion; if he does not do so, he is taken into custody and an examination
and judicial hearing are held almost immediately. In most cases, how-
ever, the prospective patient voluntarily presents himself for examination
and later at the hearing for disposition of the application.
51 Several recent studies cast severe doubts on the reliability of single-interview
psychological evaluations. Clinical concepts, taken for granted as being univer-
sally understood, are sometimes in fact unclear, and even if examiners agree
on the significance of an observed fact, the difference in techniques among psy-
chiatrists may result in different observations. Stoller and Geetsma, The Con-
sistence of Psychiatrists' Clinical Judgements, 137 J. NERVOUS AND MENTAL
DISEASES 58 (1963) ; Rosenweig et al., A Study of the Mental Status Examina-
tion, 177 Aii. 3. PSYCHIATRY 1102 (1961). But compare Jones and Kahn, Di-
mensions and Consistency of Clinical Judgement, 142 J. NERVOUS AND MENTAL
DISEASES 19 (1966).
52 This seems to have been the conclusion of the Subcommittee on Mental Health
of the California State Legislature, which recommended the abandonment of
the present involuntary hospitalization system and the substitution of "Emer-
gency Service Units" in each community. These Units would have authority to
detain dangerous persons up to-but not exceeding-seventeen days. Thisproposal is subject to serious criticism; see Note, The Need for Reform in
the California Civil Commitment Procedure, 19 STAN. L. REV. 992, 1005-08
(1967).
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While the success of the Madison program may be due to the avail-
ability of numerous psychiatrists at the University of Wisconsin or to
the efforts of the full time social worker dealing with mental health
problems, the practice deserves further consideration as an alternative
to the practice of routine pre-hearing detention for diagnostic purposes.5 3
B. Initial Judicial Participation in Involuntary Hospitalization
Wisconsin's basic procedure for involuntary hospitalization is one
of "admission by court order." Except in emergency situations, it is
contemplated that no deprivation of liberty will take place before a
judicial determination of the existence of a mental illness and the
justification for requiring the patient to submit to full-time hospitaliza-
tion. As was pointed out above, however, in practice effective judicial
involvement often comes, if at all, only after a significant deprivation
of liberty has already taken place.
It is arguable that full judicial participation prior to any deprivation
of liberty is an unrealistic and undersirable goal.4 The report of the
medical examiners may be little more than an impressionistic conclusion
drawn from a cursory interview with the patient; the patient himself
generally lacks the knowledge and ability to effectively challenge the
conclusion, and in many cases also lacks the initiative to do so. Where
the hearing is really an ex parte application for hospitalization on the
understanding that the hospital will make a thorough and reliable evalu-
ation of the patient and determine for itself whether the patient does in
fact need full time hospitalization, the hearing may perform no useful
function.
In addition, it is argued, subjecting a mentally ill individual to the
judicial hearing procedure may lessen his ability to benefit from subse-
quent treatment. Requiring-or permitting-a mentally ill individual
to listen to detailed testimony regarding his ailment serves to emphasize
to him that he is seriously ill. In response, the patient may overreact
in either of two ways: he may reject the assertion that he is actually ill,
and consequently also reject his need for treatment, thereby making
any attempt to help him more difficult. On the other hand, he may be-
come so depressed by the seriousness of his condition that he loses
53 Cf. the proposal in Comment, Liberty and Required Mental Health Treatment,
114 U. PA. L. Rzv. 1067, 1077 (1966) that "neighborhood service centers"
(combination mental health clinics and social service agencies) be used for
initial psychiatric interviews where immediate custody of the prospective pa-
tient is not necessary.
54 There is, of course, a constitutional question as to whether hospitalization prior
to a judicial hearing (where no "emergency" exists) violates due process.
Compare State ex rel Fuller v. Millinax, 364 Mo. 858, 269 S.W.2d 72 (1954)
with In the Matter of Coates, 9 N.Y.2d 242, 173 N.E.2d 797 (1961). The prob-
lem has been discussed adequately elsewhere. See, e.g., Kadish, A Case Study
in the Significance of Procedural Due Process-Istitutionalzation of the
Mentally Ill, 9 WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERMY 93 (1956); 75 HARv. L. REv.
847 (1962) ; Lindman and McIntyre, supra note 5 at 34; Ross, supra note 5
at 976-978.
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confidence in his ability to recover and may, for that reason, reject
attempts to treat him.
As a result, critics of routine early judicial participation assert that
a judicial proceeding can serve a useful purpose only where the patient
may reasonably be expected to raise some issue regarding the propriety
of his detention. To require such a proceeding in afif cases, including
those where no reasonable expectation of any such objection exists,
severely hampers attempts to treat the mentally ill with no compensating
advantage.
Other medical authorities argue, however, that in very few cases
does attendance at such a hearing cause severe discomfort or lasting
adverse effects on a patient. To the contrary, some argue that requiring
a patient to go through a well-defined procedure before he is deprived
of his liberty may be advantageous from a therapeutic point of view.
If a patient believes he has been arbitrarily deprived of his liberty or
that he has been confined with no opportunity to protest this loss of
freedom, he may react with fear or resentment. This reaction may color
his attitude towards his "captors" and make him less responsive to at-
tempts to treat him. Even patients who have apparently lost contact with
reality are sometimes found to have been more aware of their situation
than was at first supposed. In any case, these authorities conclude, the
risk of any significant damage by a relatively informal judicial hearing
is small and the potential benefits-from the medical as well as the legal
point of view-are sufficient to justify routine initial judicial participa-
tion.
There are a number of jurisdictions which have minimized early
judicial involvement in the procedure. Some proposals, such as the
procedure traditionally urged by the medical profession, would permit
hospitalization upon the certification of two physicians that the pros-
pective patient is mentally ill and meets the criteria for involuntary
hospitalization. 55 This would limit judicial participation to those cases
where the patient actively demanded it as by bringing a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. Given the prevailing attitudes on the part of the
Wisconsin public and judiciary (as well as large portions of the medical
community), such a procedure has no realistic chance of adoption. But
in view of the acceptance of the informal practices which have developed
in many counties, a procedure similar to the "admission by certification"
provided for in Article VII of the Illinois Mental Health Code is
worthy of consideration. In many cases, it would merely legitimize what
is already standard practice.
55 E.g., Committee on Psychiatry and the Law, Group for the Advancement of
Psychiatry Laws Governing Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill 153 (1966).
It is true, however, that many psychiatrists are sincerely concerned with the
danger of improper use of coercion and are willing to work within a fairly
structured system to minimize the risk of abuse of the power.
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Under the Illinois provision, a patient may be admitted to a mental
hospital (under coercion, if necessary) on the certification of two physi-
cians that he is mentally ill and meets the criteria for involuntary hos-
pitalization.56 Within twenty-four hours, the patient is to be given writ-
ten notice setting forth his rights in clear and simple language.5 7 "As
soon as practicable," but never more than five days after admission, the
patient is to be seen by a magistrate who conducts informal "consulta-
tions" at the hospital itself.5 The magistrate's duties at this consultation
are carefully spelled out: he is to identify himself, explain the patient's
rights to him (including his right to a full judicial hearing at any time),
"ask the patient to make a statement regarding the reasons for his
presence in the hospital" and specifically ask the patient if he desires
a hearing concerning his further detention.59 If the patient indicates
"in any manner" that he desires a hearing--or if the magistrate himself
finds reason to doubt the propriety of the patient's detention-a hearing
must be held within five days.60
The patient may be detained for only sixty days under this proce-
dure; at any time he may request and obtain within five days a full
judicial hearing.61 At the end of the sixty-day period, the patient (if he
has not admitted himself to the facility on a voluntary basis) must be
released or a regular involuntary commitment proceeding must be
begun.62
The procedure is obviously a compromise. It recognizes that in many
cases a full hearing accomplishes little and may cause significant harm.
But it also attempts to stimulate any latent objection a patient might
have to his hospitalization and encourages him to raise it. If such an
objection is raised, the patient is accorded the full procedural benefits
of a judicial hearing. The ultimate objective is to restrict formal judicial
participation during the first sixty days of hospitalization to those cases
where a judicial proceeding may be expected to serve some functional
purpose.
In some Wisconsin counties, the normal procedure is similar to
that contemplated by the Illinois statute: hospitalization is routinely
ordered upon application; the "hearing" is an informal meeting at the
hospital (sometimes in the patient's room) where the judge does little
more than informally converse with the patient. If this procedure rep-
resents the best possible accommodation to local conditions, it would
seem wise to legitimize it by adoption of a provision similar to that in
the Illinois statute. This would also have the advantage of formalizing
56 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 913/2, §7-1 (1965).
5 7 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91r/2, §7-2 (1965).
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
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the duties of the judge at the "consultation" and the patient's right to
a more structured proceeding if he so desires.
A strong argument in favor of the use of such a procedure is that
it may, in the long run, minimize the total coercion exerted over an in-
dividual. After a short period of hospitalization, a patient will often
recognize his need for further treatment and, after discovering that
hospitalization is not as unpleasant as he may have anticipated, will
voluntarily admit himself or remain in the facility. Commitment is then,
of course, unnecessary.
Encouraging voluntary admissions in this manner is largely a
function that only hospital staffs can perform. The treatment of the
patient during the initial "crisis period" of his illness often determines
his subsequent willingness to undergo further treatment on a voluntary
basis. 63 But by providing the medical personnel with an opportunity
to demonstrate to the patient the effectiveness and reasonableness of
treatment in a mental hospital, the statutes may make the performance
of this function much easier.
It might be wise, however, to restrict the use of this procedure to
those cases where the prospective patient has been under the care of
a physician for a significant period. In such cases the physician, because
of his contact with the situation, can reasonably be expected to recom-
mend hospitalization only where he knows, on the basis of his extended
observations, that the patient meets the statutory criteria. Perhaps in
these cases (as contrasted with those where the physician's diagnosis
is made on the basis of a single interview) the medical evaluation will,
as a general rule, be sufficiently reliable to justify postponing judicial
participation to the limited extent provided for in the Illinois-type pro-
cedure.6
Non-Protesting Admission Procedure
In response to assertions that the complex hearing procedures
often serve no useful function, a number of states have adopted non-
protesting admission procedures. These are designed to provide sum-
mary methods of admitting patients who cannot or will not admit
themselves but who will make no objection to admission if someone
else takes the initiative to secure their hospitalization.
63 Chafetz, The Effect of a Psychiatric Emergency Service on Motivation for
Psychiatric Treatment, 140 J. NERVOUS AND MENTAL DISEASES 442 (1965).64 Pre-detention judicial involvement may also serve the valuable function of
insulating from civil liability medical personnel and others involved in the
detention of the allegedly mentally ill. In Yelk v. Seefeldt, 35 Wis.2d 271, 151
N.W.2d 4 (1967) a judgment for damages against two police officers who had
signed an application for an inquiry had been obtained on a malicious prosecu-
tion theory. In reversing, the court held that there was insufficient evidence to
support the jury finding of actual malice; it was noted explicitly that once the
application was "executed," the responsibility for the procedure (and the
detention) falls almost entirely on the court. See generally, Note, Civil Liability
of Persons Participating in the Detention of the Allegedly Mentally Ill, 1966
WASH. U. L. Q. 193.
[Vol. 51
HOSPITALIZATION OF MENTALLY ILL
Under the Washington, D.C. provision, a prospective patient is
merely presented at a hospital for admission; unless the need for hos-
pitalization is apparent to the admitting physician (a member of the
hospital staff), the patient must have a referral from a practicing phy-
sician.6" The hospital physician examines the patient and if he deter-
mines that hospitalization is indicated asks the patient to sign a state-
ment to the effect that he is being hospitalized and must be released
upon request.66 Under somewhat similar provisions in New York and
Illinois, a patient may be admitted upon an application by a member
of the family and the certificate of one physician "if such person does
not object to hospitalization. '67 At the end of a short period, however,
if the patient has not become a voluntary admission and involuntary
admission proceedings have not been begun, the patient may no longer
be retained in the hospital.68
It is clear that there is a difference in purpose between the provisions.
The Washington, D.C. procedure is designed to permit long-term
hospitalization of those lacking the capacity or incentive to admit them-
selves. The New York and Illinois provision, on the other hand, are
designed as temporary measures to provide for a limited period of
hospitalization during which the patient may be convinced to submit
voluntarily to treatment or restored to a condition where he has the
capacity to do so under the applicable procedures.
Non-protesting procedures may serve a valuable function in permit-
ting the hospitalization of those patients (especially older and senile
individuals) who are proper subjects for full-time hospital care but who
lack the initiative or willingness to admit themselves. The danger, of
course, is that such a person's will is particularly subject to family or
other pressures and the patient's apparent acquiescence may be only
a submission to informal but overwhelming pressure. In such a case,
by-passing the procedural safeguards of a regular commitment creates
a significant danger of unjustified hospitalization. This danger could be
minimized, perhaps, by making non-protesting admissions also available
only where the prospective patient has for a significant period of time
been under the care of a physician who, on the basis of his extended
contact with the situation, can certify that no undue pressure has been
placed on the individual to submit to hospitalization.
Limited Period of Commitment
Under existing statutory provisions, a court which finds that an
individual should and may be hospitalized has no formal choice but
to order an indeterminate commitment. In practice this lack of a less
6
-
5 D. C. CODE §21-513 (1966 Supp.).
66 Ibid.
67 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §73; ILLINOIS REV. STAT., ch. 91Y2, §6-1. These
provisions are titled "Admission on certificate of one physician."
68 Ibid.
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drastic alternative is often compensated for by routine use (or abuse)
of the "observational commitment." 69 It seems clear, however, that this
provision was intended for use only in exceptional cases where after
the hearing the court remained in doubt as to the need for hospitalization.
A routinely available short-term commitment has the important
advantage of minimizing the need for indeterminate commitments. This
is true for two reasons. In many cases, at the end of a short period of
hospitalization a patient has received sufficient treatment so that he is
ready for release from full-time hospitalization." In other cases, by
the end of such a period the patient has recognized his need for further
treatment and will voluntarily submit to further hospitalization. In either
case, indefinite commitment with its inherently more serious deprivation
of liberty and danger (however slight) of retention beyond the time
the patient needs full time hospitalization is rendered unnecessary.
Additional long-term advantages might be realized if short-term
hospitalization under a limited commitment was provided in a local
facility. As the county hospitals improve facilities and treatment re-
sources, it may become feasible to provide substantially all short-term
intensive treatment in these institutions. This would permit the patients
to remain in the general community area and avoid extended separation
from family and acquaintances. It would facilitate the increased use of
part-time hospitalization and out-patient treatment as an alternative to
full-time hospitalization earlier in the treatment program, and would
also make easier family-oriented treatment programs during full-time
hospitalization. If effected, this would reverse the situation developed
69 Perhaps the best developed system is that of Milwaukee County where a close
working relationship has developed between the mental health facilities and the
county court. Almost never is the indeterminate commitment used before a
period of shorter detention; in fact, the indeterminate commitment is almost
never used at all (see appendix). It is clear that the temporary detention is
for the purpose of intensive short-term treatment rather than diagnosis.
70 Short term intensive treatment must not be regarded as a "cure all." Given
the limited state of scientific knowledge of mental illness, "cure" in this
context is probably a meaningless term. JOINT COMMISSION ON MENTAL ILLNESS
AND MENTAL HEALTH, ACTION FOR MENTAL HEALTH 54-55 (1961). The aim of
treatment is perhaps best described as "to resettle the patient in a normal
domestic setting and in work appropriate to his talents." Goldberg, Rehabilita-
tion of the Chronically Mentally Ill in England, 2 SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY 1, 1-2
(1967). While this must be accomplished primarily by working with the pa-
tient in his domestic and employment environment, occasional short periods of
hospitalization are often necessary to provide treatment and/or restraint during
acute episodes. Just as release from full time hospitalization cannot be re-
garded as evidence that the patient is "cured," then, rehospitalization cannot
be regarded as evidence that treatment has failed.
This can be illustrated by a statistical view of the Milwaukee system. The
acute hospital (Milwaukee North) in 1965 admitted 1,996 new patients and
had 1,603 former patients return. The median stay for patients in the acute
facility was short; in 1964 it was only 0.5 months. This did not differ signifi-
cantly between those patients released and those transferred (many to the
chronic facility, Milwaukee South). It is clear that Milwaukee North serves
as a short-term intensive treatment hospital where a patient is either released
after short-term treatment or is transferred to a chronic facility. For many
patients released, however, subsequent rehospitalization becomes necessary.
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under the county-care system: the county institutions (which have tra-
ditionally provided primarily custodial care for chronic patients) would
become oriented to providing intensive short-term treatment for acute
patients; the state institutions (now the principle acute treatment facili-
ties) would provide primarily custodial care or treatment for patients
with chronic disorders where extended separation from the family and
community is often unavoidable and more intensive treatment for those
patients whose disorder requires separation from the family or commu-
nity before clinical treatment is feasible.
An excellent example of a statutory provision authorizing short-term
commitment is the Texas provision which requires that initial commit-
ments be for a limited period not exceeding ninety days. 7' Only if
temporary hospitalization does not produce adequate results may a
petition for an indeterminate commitment be filed; if this second step
is invoked, the statute provides for a specific procedure to determine
the need for the indeterminate commitment.7 2
Any such provision should deal specifically with several matters.
First, care should be taken to make clear that the purpose of the short
period of hospitalization is not observation, but primarily short-term
intensive treatment. Second, a procedure should be provided for the
patient to effectively contest a subsequent imposition of an indefinite
commitment. Too often, under present practice; the hospital recommends
after an observational period that the patient be retained under an inde-
finite commitment and this is followed without any hearing or other
formal opportunity for a patient to be heard on this additional and more
serious deprivation of his liberty.73
Overall Procedural Scheme
In the process of providing for alternative means of admission, care
must be taken in the combination of alternatives that are made available.
71 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 5547-38 (1957).72 TEX. REV. Cirv. STAT. art. 5547-40 to art. 5547-57 (1957).
73 The new Minnesota procedure requires that the initial commitment be for
a sixty-day period. It then provides:
Within 60 days from the date of the commitment order the head of
the hospital shall file a written statement with the court . . . and a
copy thereof with the commissioner and the patient's attorney, setting
forth findings as to the condition of the patient; a diagnosis of the
patient; whether the patient is in need of further care and treatment;
whether such care and treatments, if any, must be provided in a hospital
and if so what type; whether the patient must be committed to ahospital; and whether the patient is dangerous to the public.
L. 1967, ch. 638, sec. 253.37 (23). If this statement describes the patient as in
need of further institutional care and treatment, the court is directed to
"consider" this finding and make a final disposition, which may be an indefinite
commitment. Only if the statement also describes the patient as "mentally ill
and dangerous to the public" does the statute provide for a hearing (upon
the patient's request) prior to the final disposition. Id. at Sec. 253.37 (26).
It is difficult to justify the failure to provide for equal hearing opportunity
for those patients who are not dangerous to the public but are to be deprived
of their liberty for an indeterminate period because they are in need of treat-
ment.
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First, if a true voluntary admission is provided (such as the New
York "informal admission"), it is not clear whether the present provision
which provides for a limited period of detention after notice of intent
to leave is given should be retained or not. If the two are available as
alternatives, the admitting hospital must determine at the time of ad-
mission whether there may be a subsequent need to retain the patient;
if it determines that there is a sufficient probability that this may be
necessary, the hospital would, of course, insist on the patient admitting
himself under the provision now used. An overcautious admissions
policy might severely impede attainment of the objectives of voluntary
admissions. Yet it also seems clear that in some cases the hospital could
not legitimately admit a patient knowing they have no legal right to
detain him should he subsequently decide to leave. If a voluntary ad-
missions procedure permitting limited detention is not available, the
hospital would have no choice but to insist that the patient be subjected
to commitment even though he is willing and capable of admitting him-
self on a voluntary basis.
Second, if an Illinois-type of certification provision is adopted, the
present provision for admission by court order may be unnecessary or
unwise. Illinois has retained the alternative of admission by court order;
New York (with an analagous certification procedure) has not. If it is
true, as the Madison experience suggests, that pre-hearing detention is
not routinely medically "necessary," the best solution would seem to be
to retain both procedures and require for use of the certification alter-
native that the physician attest to a medical need for immediate hospital-
ization.
The result (if the suggestions above are also implemented) would
be that where no immediate danger of violence existed, a patient might
be hospitalized without a full judicial hearing only if (1) a physician
with extended contact with the situation certified that the patient met
the criteria for involuntary hospitalization and that he had a medical
need for immediate hospitalization, or (2) the family (or friends) es-
tablished a prima facie case of such a medical need for immediate hos-
pitalization and the court specifically found that a medical determination
of this need could not be obtained without pre-hearing observational
detention. A general policy of pre-hearing liberty should, however, be
set out in the statutes.
Third, if an Illinois-type certification procedure is adopted, it is not
clear whether non-protesting procedures need also be provided. The
danger is that by making available the less formal non-protesting pro-
cedure, the safeguards of the other procedures will too often be by-
passed. On balance, it seems that the certification procedure is sufficiently
flexible that no serious inconvenience would be caused by requiring
its use in the initial admission of all non-voluntary patients (unless
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admission by court order is used). After the initial period of hospitaliza-
tion, however, non-protesting procedures could legitimately be made
available as a means of permitting the patient to remain in the hospital.
Finally, a careful choice should be made between making a limited
period of hospitalization available as an alternative to indefinite com-
mitment and making it a prerequisite to any indeterminate commitment
as Texas has done. Under the Texas-type combination, there is greater
assurance that the indeterminate commitment will not be used unless its
necessity has been demonstrated, but it also seems to require an un-
necessary series of procedural steps in those cases where the need for
an extended period of hospitalization is obvious from the time of
initial hospitalization.
The best solution would be to make both available but to require
for an initial indeterminate commitment a medical determination based
on extended observation that long-term treatment is necessary. In other
words, an indefinite commitment where no short-term commitment had
previously been imposed would be proper only where the patient had
been under pre-hearing detention for some reason, e.g., emergency de-
tention or diagnostic detention.
. Criteria for Involuntary Hospitalization
Under the existing statutory provisions, an individual is subject
to involuntary hospitalization if he is found to be "mentally ill" and
"a proper subject for custody and treatment." 4 This criteria is obviously
vague and gives no indication of what specific characteristics are to be
taken as sufficient justification for requiring an individual to submit
to treatment.
A number of states have after consideration retained equally vague
criteria which do not reflect any policy decision as to the degree of
illness or symptoms which are to be considered sufficient to justify de-
priving a mentally ill individual of his right to choose what, if any,
treatment to take. New York, for example, requires for initial hospital-
ization only that an individual be mentally ill and "suitable for care and
treatment '75 and for continued retention only that the condition of the
patient require his continued retention in a hospital.7 6 While it is
arguable that this reflects a legislative determination that any individual
who is mentally ill and whom the medical authorities are willing to
74 WIs. STAT. §51.02(5), 51.03 (1965). While there is some confusion as to the
effect on this criteria of the new definition of "mental illness" (see note 39,
supra), it is doubtful whether the definitional section affects the substance
of the basic criteria set out in these sections.
75 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §72.
76 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §73. In a jury proceeding to review a court order
authorizing continued retention, the only jury question is apparently whether
the patient is mentally ill. N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §74.
The New York provisions have been severely criticized by Chaikin, Coin-
mitment by Fiat: New York's New Mental Law, 1 CoLuim. J. OF LAW AND
SOCIAL PROBLEMS 113 (1965) as inadequately reflecting the legislative decision
that need for custodial care is not sufficient justification for commitment.
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accept as a patient may be compelled to submit to hospitalization, the
statute does not reflect the express grant of authority which one would
expect in such a drastic delegation of authority to the medical profession.
It is more probable that the vagueness represents an abdication by the
legislature of its responsibility of framing the criteria for the exercise
of coercion over the mentally ill.
Washington, D. C. has gone to the opposite extreme by restricting
involuntary hospitalization to those "likely to injure [themselves] . . .
or others if allowed to remain at liberty."77 While the apparent objective
of this provision is to permit the use of coercion to administer treatment
only where the lack of such treatment creates a relatively clear and
immediate danger of physical violence, broad construction of the
"danger" which will justify hospitalization may make this criteria less
restrictive than it seems at first glance.78
Perhaps a more satisfactory test would emphasize the ability of
the individual to make a rational decision as to his own need for treat-
ment. Thus, the statute might permit involuntary hospitalization of
those who are determined to be "mentally ill" and who, because of
their mental illness, "pose an immediate threat to the safety of themselves
or others, or who do not have the capacity to make a rational decision
as to their need for hospitalization.1 79 Such a test assumes, of course,
77D. C. CODE §21-541(1) (1966 Supp.).
78 See Cantor and Sherman, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in the District
of Columbia, 15 AM. U. L. REv. 203 (1966). For support of such a criteria,
see Comment, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 668, 683 (1959).
There are a number of practical problems in applying a "dangerousness"
criteria. First, it is by no means clear what conduct is "dangerous." Will, for
example, the traumatic effect on a family of the bizarre behavior of one of its
members make the conduct "dangerous ?" Second, it is not clear what certainty
that the dangerous activity will be performed is necessary. Does "likely to"
mean "may possibly" or does it imply a probability of 25, 50, 76 or 97 percent?
It is unlikely that medical examiners would be willing to express their diag-
nosis in terms of percentage probability. See generally, Goldstein and Katz,
Dangerousness and Mental Illness, Some Observations on the Decision to
Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 YALE L. J. 224, 230-39
(1960).
79 The Draft Act suggests, in addition to a "likely to injure himself or others"
test, that a patient be subject to involuntary hospitalization if he is "in need
of care or treatment in a mental hospital, and because of his illness, lacks
sufficient insight or capacity to make responsible application therefore." See
Lindman and McIntyre, supra note 5 at 20-21. This has been criticized as too
broad on the assumption that it would permit involuntary hospitalization of
even severe neurotics and psychoneurotics. Whitmore, Comments on a Draft
Act for the Hospitalization of the Mentally Il, 19 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 512
(1951). The most telling criticism, it seems, is the ambiguity of "insight or
capacity to make responsible application for hospitalization." While it would
seem to include those without the capacity to "contract away" their liberty,
it also includes some-but how many is not clear-who have not become in-
competent but who are considered incapable of making a decision as to their
need for hospitalization.
A somewhat similar proposal was made in Note, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1288,
1295 (1966) which suggested authorizing commitment of "persons who, because
of mental illness, would be likely to make decisions about their own interests
which would result in substantial damage to their mental or physical well-
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that a person could rationally decide to forego treatment despite the
risk of deterioration of his mental illness and the possible development
of tendencies towards violence directed at himself or others. We have
in the field of physical illness recognized an individual's right to refuse
treatment despite near certainty that such refusal will mean harm to the
individual himself and those associated with him (as, for example, his
family's loss of support).s0 There is no logical basis for differentiating
those situations where the illness is mental, if the afflicted individual
has not lost the capacity to weigh for himself the alternatives.
In evaluating the alternative criteria, two factors are of primary
importance. The first is the philosophical justification being invoked
for the exercise of force.81 If the state's police power provides the
authority, it necessarily follows that no individual may legitimately be
hospitalized who does not present a significant threat to society or
other individuals. It is arguable, however, that among the threats to
society which may be considered is the loss of the patient himself and
those things which he contributes to society. The decision to hospitalize,
in any case, is a balance between the social interest in protecting society
from the effects of this specific individual's illness and the individual's
interest in being free from interference with his own decisions.
If, on the other hand, the justification asserted is the state's parens
patriae power and responsibility to protect and make decisions for an
individual who is considered unable to make decisions as his own best
interests dictate, a different situation is presented. To society's interest
in the balancing process must be added the individual's own interest in
being treated if treatment would in fact be in his own best interest-in
other words, there can be added a mentally ill person's "right to treat-
ment" irrespective of whether he himself recognizes the need for that
treatment. To the extent that the exercise of the parens patriae power is
accepted as a legitimate and desirable function of government, a broad-
ening of the criteria for the exercise of coercion can be justified.
The second important factor is the role which the facilities to which
the patient is committed play in the overall treatment program for the
being." The ambiguities here are considerable: "Likely to," "substantial dam-
age," "mental or physical well-being."
It seems that a person who is mentally ill could rationally decide to forego
treatment despite substantial risk to his "well being" or that of others. No
sufficient reason has yet been suggested why a patient with a mental illness
should not be allowed the same prerogative as one with a physical illness-that
of weighing the "cost" of treatment (in terms of loss of liberty, financial
burden, and personal preference) against the risks of non-treatment. Perhaps
under the two tests described above if a decision is a rational weighing of the
alternatives, it is not "because of" mental illness. But this should be made
clearer. The emphasis should be on the individual's mental process, not on
the result be reaches through that process.
80 Cf. In re Brooks' Estate, 32 Ill.2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965). But see Applica-
tion of President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
81 See generally Ross, supra note 5 at 954-60; Note, 79 HARv. L. Rzv. 1288 (1966).
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mentally ill when viewed in light of other treatment resources. It has
been suggested that full-time hospitalization is now-or soon will be-
obsolete as a means of treating mentally ill individuals who are not
suicidal or homicidal. s2 If true, this suggests that involuntary commit-
ment should be limited to those mentally ill persons who pose a physical
danger to themselves or others, and that some other means should be
found to stimulate other mentally ill persons to use other available
facilities such as out-patient clinics and part-time hispitals. But, especial-
ly in view of the limited number of alternative resources available, the
prevailing view is that full-time hospitalization is still a valuable stage
in the treatment of many non-violent mentally ill persons . 3
82 Recent refinements in the treatment of psychoses have given rise to
serious question as to whether psychiatric hospitalization is truly neces-
sary for an individual, no matter how ill he may be. Improvements in
psychotherapy, new drugs, group and family therapy, day and night
hospitals, halfway houses, and foster care represent some of the new
therapeutic techniques utilized in attempts to avoid hospitalization of
the severely ill patient.
These recently developed approaches to treatment arose out of two
major trends of the past several decades: first, the more effective treat-
ment of psychoses through psychotherapy and somatic therapies, and
second, recognition of the tendency of traditional mental hospital set-
tings to aggrevate and protract illness. Not only have all of these new
modalities been useful in treatment of specific types of psychotic patients,
but they have now been proposed as alternatives to hospitalization, in
fact, as opening the way to elimination of the 24-hour hospital experience.
Mechanick and Nathan, Is Psychiatric Hospitalization Obsolete? 141 J. NER-
VOUS AND MENTAL DIsEASEs 378, (1965).
For an optimistic forecast arising out of a three year experimental program
conducted in Jefferson County, Kentucky, see Pasamanick, Scarpitti and Dinitz,
Schizophrenics in the Community 248 (1967) : "The project demonstrated in a
most conclusive way that home care under drug medication with systematic
public health nursing care is quite feasible for . . . schizophrenic patients.
Even the minimal type of home care provided proved in every respect at least
as effective, and in most respects, clearly superior, to treatment in a hospital.
. . It is . . . a reasonable inference that other categories of the mentally ill
may be successfully treated in this way." In selecting patients for the study,
however, the authors carefully eliminated all suicidal or homicidal patients and
restricted participation to those with a family (or an equivalent) willing to
accept and supervise the patient in the home. Unfortunately, not all of the
mentally ill are as fortunate as those who met the criteria for inclusion in the
study.
At least where the only defined problem of a "mentally ill" person is not
essentially pathological but rather one of symptomatic inability to cope with
family or other environmental situations, isolated clinical treatment is quite
clearly inappropriate. Thus a recent study of married patients in a state mental
hospital concluded that their problems originated in "severe and longstanding
marital conflict. Yet a stay in a state mental hospital without the use of family-
oriented therapy would seem to execerbate the problem rather than improve
the patient's mental health." Miller and Barnhouse, Married Mental Patients
in Crisis: A Research Report, 124 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 364, 369 (1967).
83 "We now see [the full-time mental hospital] . . . in its true perspective as a
hospital for selected patients, mostly with good prognosis, but needing a special
treatment and conditions which cannot be provided by an outpatient service."
Carse, Panton and Watt, A District Mental Health Service: The Worthington
Experiment, 1 LANcET 39, (1958). Mechanick and Nathan conclude that full-
time hospitalization remains a valuable stage in the treatment continuum for
any persons whose behavior does not need control; hospitalization must, they
caution, be viewed as a "therapeutic maneuver in the course of a treatment
program rather than a final step." Mechanick and Nathan, supra note 82 at
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In practice, commitment is more than a means of compelling an
individual to submit to full-time hospitalization. Most patients spend only
a short time in a full-time hospital.s But the possibility of return to the
full-time facility often serves as a motivation for a partially-recovered
person to make maximum use of other treatment resources. It is also
true that the decision as to whether a patient must be retained in a
full-time hospital for an extended period or whether he may be permitted
relative freedom while he receives out-patient care is a decision in most
cases best left to medical personnel. The crowded condition of many
mental hospitals and the lack of adequate staffs suggests that medical
authorities will not permit an individual to remain hospitalized beyond
the point where they feel he can function adequately elsewhere and still
receive adequate care. The ability of a hospital to release a patient as
soon after commitment as the staff deems desirable provides sufficient
flexibility to make involuntary commitments in reality commitments to
a treatment continuum, only one part of which involves full-time
hospitalization.
This argues in favor of broader criteria. Commitment may legiti-
mately be used to require a patient to submit to a program of treatment
which involves significantly less deprivation of liberty than would full-
time hospitalization. The less the deprivaton of liberty involved, the less
need be the social interest invoked to justify bringing legal coercion into
play.
It would be possible to authorize the courts to order a patient to
submit directly to treatment resources other than full-time hospitals
without first being admitted to the full-time hospital.8 , If this is a
382. See also Haun, Chronicity and the Mental Hospital, 39 PsYcHIATRIc
QUARTERLY SUPPLEMENT 18, 24 (1967), who agrees that as a general rule only
if a patient fails to respond to short periods of hospitalization in a local
facility should he be removed to a large mental hospital, but who also observes
that in some situations "therapy can never proceed until community and even
family ties are severed by full time hospitalization in a large institution re-
moved from the patient's environment. .. ."
84 The median length of stay of patients released from all county and state
hospitals in 1964 was 1.3 months. Wisconsin Dept. of Public Welfare, Trends
in Length of Stay at Wisconsin State and County Mental Hospitals 1960-64,
9 STATrscAL BULLETN MH-41, May 1966. (Comparable figures for patients
dying in the instituitons were significantly higher. Id. at 10. Most deaths, how-
ever, occurred in county hospitals.) As might be anticipated, the length of stay
varied with diagnosis. Patients diagnosed as "mental deficiency" averaged 8.0
months in 1964, followed by those with schizophrenic reactions, other psychotic
disorders and diseases of the senium. Patients diagnosed as suffering from
psychoneurotic reactions and personality disorders averaged only 0.5 months
in 1964. Id., Table 5 (all figures are medians).
85 See generally Bleicher, Compulsory Community Care for the Mentally Ill, 16
CLEv. MARsH. L. REv. 93, 112-15 (1967) who proposes the establishment of a
mental health treatment board with supervisory powers over local counselors.
This board would advise a committing court as to the best program of treat-
ment for a patient found to meet the criteria for involuntary treatment; this
might involve initial full-time hospitalization of the patient or his placement
in the custody of a counselor who would supervise his treatment in outpatient
facilities.
The District of Columbia statute authorizes the committing court to "order
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practical possibility, the criteria for commitment to full-time hospitaliza-
tion could be made more restrictive while that for "supervised outpatient
treatment" could legitimately be much broader. California has done this by
authorizing the release of a prospective patient to the care of the coun-
selor in mental health 6 if he does not meet the criteria for involuntary
commitment but is found to be "mentally disoriented and bordering on
mental illness but not dangerously ill.
' '8
7
In practice, the same result is often accomplished informally in
Wisconsin. A judicial inquiry is sometimes suspended on the condition
that the patient receive treatment from designated public or private re-
sources. In other cases, a commitment is made but the patient is retained
for only a short period in the full-time facility and conditionally released
subject to return should he fail to make use of designated treatment
resources or respond satisfactorily to them. This system, of course, is
subject to the criticisms made of many informal sub rosa procedures:
the criteria on which the decision to require out-patient treatment is
made is not open to evaluation or criticism, and there are no safeguards
to assure that it is applied uniformly.
But formalizing the practice by permitting the court to order, as an
alternative to full-time hospitalization, that the patient submit to other
forms of therapy poses serious problems. In view of the limited value
of presently-available pre-hearing diagnoses, it is probably not feasible
for a court to obtain (without full-time hospitalization) sufficiently
reliable information on which to base a choice among alternative treat-
ment procedures. It would be more realistic to make such a disposition
available as an alternative to further full-time hospitalization after a
limited period of hospitalization pursuant to a short-term commitment.
But there is still significant doubt that the decision as to when a patient
can and should be treated other than in a full-time facility is properly
a judicial one. Like the decision as to whether society is justified in re-
quiring non-voluntary treatment, social as well as medical factors are
involved; but in view of the predominance of medical factors in the
decision as to the treatment program, deference to the expertise of
hospital personnel seems advisable. Moreover, effective supervision of
individuals under court order to make use of treatment facilities other
than a full-time hospital would pose a difficult problem to a court which
hospitalization . . . or order any other alternative course of treatment which
the court believes will be in the best interests of the person or of the public."
D.C. CODE §21-545(b). In Lake v. Cameron, 364 F2d 657 (D.C. Cir., 1966), the
court (sitting en banc) reversed a district court's denial of an application for
a writ of habeas corpus by a patient in Saint Elizabeth's Hospital. Noting
that the patient was dangerous only in the sense that she was apt to wander
about the streets, the court remanded to the district court for an inquiry into
"other alternative courses of treatment." Under the District of Columbia
statute, it is clear, a patient may have a "right" to treatment in the community.
86 See text at n. 107, infra.
87 CAL. WEL. AND INST. CODE §5568.
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did not have available personnel devoted to mental health matters. Full-
time hospitals, while certainly not adequately equipped for such a task,
are presently more likely to have available personnel professionally
equipped to provide such supervision.
Thus, in the absence of a professional court-attached staff devoted
to coordinating non-institutional treatment resources and over-seeing the
use of such facilities by patients under court order, it seems wise not to
expand the dispositional alternatives beyond commitment to a full-time
hospital. Hospital authorities must, of course, retain sufficient flexibility
to release each patient when he is deemed ready and when ap-
propriate outside treatment resources are determined to be available.
Authority to supervise the patient's activities for a period of time must
also be retained. There is no apparent means of enforcement available
other than return to full-time hospitalization. The use of the contempt
power, backed by the ultimate sanctions of imprisonment or fine, is
obviously inappropriate in view of the therapeutic objective. Neverthe-
less, it might be wise to provide a procedure whereby approval of the
committing court could be obtained for post-release treatment programs.
The fact that the "obligation" is one imposed by court order rather than
by doctor's directions might, in some cases, effectively encourage com-
pliance.
In any event, the possibility of reducing the number of mentally ill
who are hospitalized around the clock by establishing a coordinated
system of supervised out-patient facilities constitutes a strong argument
in favor of court-attached social service agencies devoted to mental
health matters.
Role of the Attorney in Hospitalization Procedures
The present statutory provisions are extremely vague as to the right
of a prospective patient to the assistance of legal counsel. The only
provision bearing on the question merely authorizes the court, at any
point in the proceedings, to appoint a guardian ad litem "if it determines
that the best interests of the patient require it."8 In view of the current
emphasis on the right to representation in the criminal and juvenile
justice fields, the role of legal counsel in involuntary hospitalization pro-
ceedings seems a problem deserving serious consideration.
The constitutional right to representation, if it exists, is not well
established. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in 1957 established a requirement that in hearings before the
Commission (which may or may not be followed by a judicial hearing
under the procedure followed in the District of Columbia) a prospective
patient have either a guardian or counsel appointed, even if he does
not desire such assistance.8 9 In view of the fact that a guardian need
88Wxs. STAT. §51.02(4) (1965).
89 Dooling v. Overhosler, 243 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir., 1957).
19671
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
not be an attorney, however, the court expressly observed, "We have
not decided . . . that an alleged insane person must be represented by
an attorney at hearings before the Commission."9
One commentator has recently taken the position that there is a
constitutional right to counsel in mental commitment proceedings and
that this right includes access to assigned counsel. 91 This view is sub-
stantiated by a recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals hold-
ing that "an indigent mental patient, who is committed to an institution,
is entitled, in a habeas corpus proceeding (brought to establish his
sanity), to the assignment of counsel as a matter of constitutional
right."92 This, of course, implies a similar right in the original hospital-
ization proceeding. In view of the potentially serious deprivation of
liberty involved and the importance of an accurate factual determination
of the justification for this deprivation of freedom, it seems almost
certain that the constitutional right to assistance of counsel does-or
soon will-extend to involuntary hospitalization proceedings.
A number of statutory provisions have dealt with the problem.
Washington, D.C. requires that "the allegedly mentally ill person shall
be represented by counsel in any proceeding before the Commission or
the court, and if he fails or refuses to obtain counsel the court shall
appoint counsel to represent him." 93 Under the Illinois provision for
hospitalization pursuant to court order, the court must ask at the hearing
whether the prospective patient desires counsel and must then comply
with any request for counsel. 94 But under the Illinois provision for
short-term hospitalization without a judicial hearing, if the patient indi-
cates a desire for a hearing, the court must arrange for appointment of
counsel." Under the Texas statute, in each case "the county judge...
shall appoint an attorney ad litem to represent the proposed patient."'
Since in Wisconsin a guardian ad Vitem must, by statute, be an attor-
ney,97 the constitutional requirement would probably be met by a pro-
vision for the appointment of a guardian in every proceeding. But in
the absence of a clear definition of the role of the guardian this would
90 Id. at 828 (supplemental opinion).91 Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Comnzitment of the Mentally
Ill, 44 TEX. L. Rxv. 424, 438 (1966).
92 People ex rel Rogers v. Stanley, 17 N.Y.2d 256, 217 N.E.2d 636 (1966). A
strong dissent was registered by Judge Bergan who observed, "Thus, the ad-
versary trial of medical issues implicit in the universal and compulsory assign-
ment of counsel . . . seems at once unwise and injudicious." 17 N.Y.2d at 263,
217 N.E.2d at 638.
93 D.C. CODE §21-543 (1966 Supp.).
94 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91Y2, §8-22. Specific provision has been made for appointed
counsel for an indigent patient. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91%, §8-22.1.
951LL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 %, §7-2.
96TEX. REV. Civ. STAT., ART. 5547-43 (1957). See also the new Minnesota pro-
vision. L. 1967, ch. 638, Sec. 253.37(15), requiring appointment of counsel at
the time the medical examiners are designated.
97 Wis. STAT. §256.48 (1965).
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probably be no more than a pro forma compliance with the constitutional
mandate.
In present practice, it seems clear that in almost all cases where a
guardian is appointed he sees his role not as an advocate for the pros-
pective patient but as a traditional guardian whose function is to evaluate
for himself what is in the best interests of his client-ward and then pro-
ceed, almost independent of the will of the client-ward, to accomplish
this. This attitude is encouraged by some county judges who see the
introduction of an attorney (if he performs in any other way) into the
proceeding as turning the informal hearing into an adversary trial,
thereby destroying the valuable flexibility and damaging the patient by
subjecting him to a traumatic "trial" experience.
In most cases, performance of the role of a traditional guardian is
probably all that can realistically be expected of an attorney since in the
majority of cases the patient does not wish to protest the hospitalization
or, if he does, has no real basis on which to do so. The danger, of course,
is that by making no real advocate available the occasional patient with
a legitimate objection may find no one available to help him effectively
assert it.
Perhaps the problem can be partially solved by inserting in the
statutes a clear definition of the proper duties of a guardian ad liten.
Compliance with the constitutional mandate requires that if the prospec-
tive patient wishes to actively contest his hospitalization (as by challeng-
ing the factual data on which the need for hospitalization is based), the
guardian must perform essentially an adversary's role in presenting the
patient's objection to the court. It seems equally clear that if the attorney
feels strongly that it would be in the best interests of his client-ward
to submit to hospitalization, he may indicate this to the client-ward and
attempt to persuade him to admit himself to a hospital or not to oppose
the proceeding. He must, however, be extremely careful not to take
advantage of the coercive atmosphere of the usual pre-hearing situation
and the confused condition of many prospective patients to subtly coerce
the individual into acquiescense. The line between counseling and coer-
cion can only be drawn by each attorney for himself in the specific
situation; but he must be aware that the line needs to be drawn.
In the majority of cases, where the prospective patient does not
desire to contest the proceeding or has no basis on which to do so, the
attorney can perform a different role somewhat analagous to his function
in "plea bargaining." He can investigate alternatives to full-time hos-
pitalization and explore with the prospective patient the possible use of
these facilities or the possibility of voluntary admission. At the hearing
stage itself, he can see that all relevant facts are carefully presented to
the court and require the medical examiners to elaborate sufficiently on
their findings to assure that they have made a reliable diagnosis.
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Spelling out the role of the guardian ad litem in this manner would
encourage the observation of the spirit as well as the letter of the con-
stitutional mandate and would help the legal profession to perform a
constructive function in the numerous proceedings where their adversary
talents are otherwise of little use.
98
Periodic Review of Commitments
Under the present provisions, a patient once committed has no
formal right to a review of the justification for his continued retention
unless he (or someone in his behalf) takes affirmative action to secure
a judicial re-examination. Once put into motion, the re-examination
procedure is almost as detailed as the original commitment. 99 While
there would be little reason to eliminate this provision, it might be wise
to consider an additional requirement for a less complex re-evaluation
to be made routinely, i.e., without an affirmative action on the part
of the patient.
Such a requirement would have two primary advantages. First, some
patients may be unaware of their right to judicial re-examinations.
While there is now less danger of a patient under involuntary commit-
ment languishing in a hospital simply because no one in a position of
authority has re-examined his need for continued retention, even the
remote possibility that such a condition might exist (most likely in some
of the less well-staffed county facilities) constitutes a strong argument
for such a requirement. Second, it is likely that some patients remain
hospitalized not because of an "illness" in any medical sense, but because
they lack the initiative to request release and arrange for a new life in
the outside world. Routine re-examination of their status might stimulate
them into taking the initiative necessary to make a successful transition
from the institution to the community. Such re-examinations might also
serve to emphasize to hospital staffs the number of patients whose medi-
cal condition does not require their continued hospitalization and per-
98 A related question concerns the services of an attorney for those seeking in-
voluntary hospitalization of a relative or friend. No statutory provision
specifically authorizes such participation by an attorney; Wis. STAT. §51.02(3)
(1965) provides that the District Attorney is to assist in the proceedings if
requested to do so by the judge. In many cases, the District Attorney does,
upon the request of a family or the judge, perform the mechanics required to
begin a judicial proceeding. At least one county court has adopted a strict
requirement that any family (or individual) seeking involuntary hospitalization
procure the services of a private attorney. The judge feels that only by having
both sides represented by counsel can he maintain the detachment that he feels
is essential to an impartial fact-finding process and also assure adequate pre-
sentation of all relevant facts. In those counties where a court-attached social
service agency exists, this agency often assumes the burden of performing the
mechanical tasks of bringing a judicial proceeding; this would undoubtedly be
another advantage to more widespread use of such agencies. Compare the
provision in the new Minnesota statute: "In all commitment . . .proceedings
the county attorney shall appear and represent the petitioner." Minn. L. 1967,
ch. 638, Sec. 253.37(15).
9 9 Wis. STAT. §51.11 (1965).
[Vol. 51
HOSPITALIZATION OF MENTALLY ILL
haps stimulate them into a more active program of arranging for re-
leases by finding the patient a place in the community.
A number of provisions have been adopted by other states to achieve
these objectives. Some require only that each hospital examine each
patient periodically to determine whether he should still be retained in
the hospital. 100 Others require more; Illinois directs that after each
such examination, written reports "setting forth the reasons supporting
the need for further hospitalization of the patient" be filed and that
notice of the decision to retain the patient (plus a reminder of the right
to obtain a hearing on the need for continued retention) be given to the
patient, his relatives, the person who applied for his commitment and
any person designated by the patient to receive such reports.101 New
York hopes to achieve similar results by abolishing indefinite commit-
ments and substituting limited terms (the initial period is sixty days;
the second is six months; the next for up to one year; all subsequent
periods may be for up to two years) ;102 if the hospital determines that
the patient needs further hospitalization notices similar to those required
in Illinois are sent out. If no hearing is demanded by anyone concerned,
the commiting court may order a further limited term of commitment
without a hearing. 0 3 It is unlikely that where no hearing is held the
court makes any real independent evaluation of the need for continued
retention.
It is probably unrealistic to expect that any such procedure could
result in independent re-evaluations by the courts of the need for
continued retention. Even if the county courts had sufficient time (which
seems doubtful), the reports could probably not be detailed enough to
permit such re-evaluations. The objective of such a requirement should
be not to secure outside review of a hospital's decision that patients need
further hospitalization but rather the development of an internal pro-
cedure which assures that the hospitals routinely re-examine the status
of each patient in light of any changes in his condition. If a provision
for informal "consultations" with a magistrate at the hospital is adopted
(the Illinois-type procedure), it might be feasible to require periodic
"consultations." This would be the closest that it would seem possible
to come to providing for a judicial supervision of the decision to retain
committed patients.
Care must also be taken to emphasize that re-evaluations are certain
not to produce a mass exodus from mental health facilities. It is dis-
tressingly clear that many patients presently under commitment do
not "need" full time hospitalization in any medical sense. Inability or
10 oLindman and McIntyre, supra note 5 at 150-51.10 ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 91Y2, §7-7.
102 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §73(1), (3).
103 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §73(1). The court must be "satisfied," however,
that the patient requires retention.
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unwillingness of families and communities to accommodate the incon-
venience of caring for and providing treatment for a mentally ill person
explains the continued presence of a significant number of mental pa-
tients in full-time facilities. No periodic re-evaluation of their status can
enable hospital authorities to return them to the community. Only an
increased awareness and understanding of the problems of mental ill-
ness on the part of communities and families can solve this problem.
Court-Attached Social Service Agency
Under existing practice, most Wisconsin county courts handle hos-
pitalization matters without any special facilities to assist them in such
matters. Applications for judicial inquiries are in many cases taken by
individuals whose primary function relates to other aspects of the county
court's jurisdiction: the register in probate, the court reporter or the
district attorney. If an early attempt (before detention or hearing) is
made to screen out those cases in which there is no merit to the applica-
tion or where measures short of commitment might be adequate, this is
usually done by the busy county judge or those who accept the applica-
tion. In any case, this preliminary check is seldom performed by anyone
with a professional background in the field of social work or mental
health.
Several states have attempted to remedy this type of situation by
providing for a trained staff to be attached to the judicial agency hand-
ling mental commitments. The most detailed statutory provision is that
of California,'0 which authorizes each county to create a position for
one or two "counselors in mental health," to be appointed by the judge
and to hold office at his pleasure.1 0 5
As practice under this provision has developed in some areas, one
applying for a judicial inquiry is first required to make a "pre-petition
application" to the counselor, who then conducts his own investigation
to determine whether there is sufficient cause for a medical examination
and a full judicial inquiry. If he determines that there is, he contacts
the prospective patient and gives him an opportunity to have a mental
examination conducted on a voluntary basis by a psychiatrist of his
own choice. In most cases, the prospective patient is not detained before
the hearing but is merely issued an "order to appear."'106
104 CAL. WEL. AND INST. CODE §5025-50. For descriptions of the implementation
of these provisions, see Comment, Cornnitment of the Mentally Ill-Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, 36 So. CAL. L. REv. 109 (1962) and Nix, Recent
Procedural Revisions in the Psychiatric Department, Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, 34 Los ANGELES BAR BULLETIN 291 (1959). See also Blackley,
Judicial Intervention as a Psychiatric Therapy Tool, 15 CLEV. MARSH. L. REV.
506 (1966) for a description of the Cuyhoga County (Ohio) Probate Court
Psychiatric Unit developed pusuant to the general authority in OHIO STAT.
§5522.13: "At the direction of the probate court, a pre-hearing ... investiga-
tion may be made by ...a competent social worker or other investigator
appointed by the probate court."
105 CAL. WEL. AND INST. CODE §5025.
106 Comment, supra note 104, at 113-17.
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Before the judicial hearing, the counselor makes an investigation
of "the antecedents, character, family history, environment and super-
inducing cause of the mental disorder."' 107 A report is made available
to the court before or at the time of hearing.
If, at the hearing, the court determines that full-time hospitalization
is not necessary but that the prospective patient is "mentally disoriented
and bordering on mental illness but not dangerously ill," it may commit
him to the custody of the counselor. 08 In such cases, the patient remains
at home, usually receiving care on an out-patient basis, subject to return
to the court (and full-time hospitalization) should the arrangement not
work satisfactorily.
At least two Wisconsin counties have programs almost identical
to those developed under the California statute, and both report ex-
tremely satisfying results from their experiments. It might be wise to
recognize the potential value of such agencies by making express pro-
vision for them in the statutes; perhaps local communities could be
assisted in establishing them by the provision of state financial assistance
as is presently done for community mental health clinics. 10 9 In fact, the
agency (especially in counties with relatively small populations) could
be combined with some other facility such as a community mental health
center or the county hospital.
While the precise function of such an agency would depend on the
local needs and conditions as well as the inclinations of the county
judge, the potential value of the agencies is evident from a list of the
functions they might perform. First, by conducting a screening of all
applications for judicial inquiries, the agency could weed out those with
little or no merit and those where measures short of commitment would
meet the need; this would also help disclose at the earliest possible point
those few cases where the application is an attempt to "railroad" an
individual into a mental hospital. Second, the agency could help mini-
mize the use of pre-hearing detention by arranging for voluntary psy-
chiatric examinations and voluntary attendance at the hearings."10 Third,
the agency could at all points of the proceeding encourage a prospective
107 CAL. WEL. AND INST. CODE §5029.
10 8 CAL. WEL. AND INST. CODE §5568.
109 Wis. STAT. §51.36 (1965). The wisest course, it would seem, would be merely
to authorize such agencies and offer financial assistance to those counties es-
tablishing them. In some areas, the small volume of cases would make the
services of a full-time worker unnecessary; the community may also be so
closely-knit that all relevant information is readily available to the judge
through informal channels. But most important, the successful operation of
such an agency depends on a close working relationship between the judge
and the worker; any attempt to force such an agency upon an unsympatheticjudge could not produce desirable results.
110 Provision of such an agency would not automatically eliminate pre-hearing
detention. Of the two Wisconsin counties already utilizing such agencies, one
routinely uses pre-hearing detention while the other has effectively minimized
its use. Available facilities, community attitude and the position taken by the
county judge all exert influence on the extent of use of pre-hearing detention.
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patient (if he, in fact, needs hospitalization) to admit himself as a
voluntary patient, thereby minimizing the need for involuntary commit-
ments. Fourth, the agency could prepare histories of the prospective
patients for submission to the court to help it determine the justification
for hospitalization; in light of the numerous non-medical factors that
in practice affect the decision to hospitalize, such an investigation may
prove as valuable as the medical examination. Fifth, the agency could
carefully explain to prospective patients and those already hospitalized
their legal status and their legal rights and disabilities. Such careful ex-
planations by one trained in work with the mentally ill would probably
be more effective in bringing about an awareness of the rights than an
explanation by the court or the guardian ad litem. Finally, by working
with the patient's family as well as with the patient himself, the agency
would be able to assist the family to understand and accept the afflicted
person's condition, thereby paving the way for the successful (and
early) return of the patient to the family or community. 11' In some
cases, it is reasonable to assume that hospitalization might be avoided
altogether by making arrangements through the family for non-
institutional care for the individual.
1 12
IV. CONCLUSION
No attempt has been made here to evaluate the extent of non-
compliance with the present statutory provisions. The objective has been
to simply point out the areas in which such non-compliance does occur
and various changes which might be made in response to this. Any re-
liable conclusions regarding the extent of the questionable practices
described above will have to await a more intensive study.
The discussion here does, however, permit the formulation of the
Information Service. The authorization, section 8 of the New York Mental
Information Service. The authorization, section 88 of the New York Mental
Hygiene Law, was enacted pursuant to the recommendation of the Special
Committee of the New York City Bar, Mental Illness and Due Process 21-22(1962). The Service, under the supervision of the presiding justices of thejudicial departments, has the duties of reviewing the admission and retention
of patients, informing them of their legal rights, assembling information forjudicial consideration and counseling and advising patients. For a thorough
description and evaluation of the Service after two years of operation, see
Note, The New York Mental Health Service: A New Approach to Hospital-
ization of the Mentally IIl, 67 COL. L. REv. 672 (1967). Similar systems have
been recommended for other states. See, e.g., Kenefick, et. al., The Massachu-
setts Commitment and Hospitalization Laws for the Mentally Ill; An Analysis
and Proposal for Change, 2 PORTIA L. REV. 19, 27-29 (1967).
112 The problem of readjusting a patient who has undergone full-time hospitaliza-
tion to community life is recognized as a serious therapeutic problem. See
Kasser and Cohen, Follow-Up: Aftercare of Discharged Chronic Mental Pa-
tients, 40 PSYCHIATRIc QUARTERLY 723 (1966) ; Hotchkiss and Prout, Use of
the Community in the Re-habilitation of Patients, 39 PsYcHIATRIC QUARTERLY
SUPPLEMENT 288 (1965). The coordination of community services might be of
value to the ex-patient who has been described as an "endlessly complicated and
frustrating problem." Coleman, A Comninunity Project in Behalf of the Hos-
pitalized Mentally Ill Patient: The Cooperative Care Project, 124 Al't. J.
PSYCHIATRY 76, 79 (1967).
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basic features which, in light of present knowledge and attitudes, should
be contained in realistic statutory provisions for the hospitalization of
the mentally ill.
First, the provisions should recognize that voluntary rather than
involuntary hospitalization should be used whenever possible; non-
coercive admissions should be made attractive and readily available and
those working with the mentally ill should encourage the use of these
procedures wherever feasible.
Second, the legislature should assume its responsibility for establish-
ing the criteria for involuntary hospitalization. Rather than the present
ambiguous provision which permits-in fact, requires-local courts and
physicians to read their own criteria into the statute, the statutory pro-
vision should expressly indicate the degree of need for treatment, dan-
gerousness or irrationality that will justify the use of coercion to com-
pel a mentally ill individual to undergo treatment.
Third, local conditions should be thoroughly examined to determine
why the statutory scheme is not being routinely followed. Where the
deviations represent necessary accommodations to local conditions, they
should be "legitimized." 1 3 (For example, perhaps the routine use of
pre-hearing detention for diagnostic purposes should be expressly au-
thorized in some geographical areas.) But the statute should also indi-
cate the most desirable procedure and contain sufficient flexibility to
enable a given community to change to the preferred procedure when
local conditions permit.
Fourth, the statutes should recognize that where a patient does not
affirmatively raise any objection to his hospitalization, a full judicial
proceeding will perform no valuable function and may be detrimental
to the patient; but where the patient may have an objection, the oppor-
tunity to obtain a thorough judicial investigation of this complaint is an
extremely valuable right. Somewhat summary procedures such as the
Illinois provision should probably be made available, but emphasis should
be placed on encouraging the patient to raise any objections he may have
to his hospitalization. This requires making him effectively aware of his
status and legal rights as well as making available an adequate oppor-
tunity to assert these rights.
Fifth, it should be recognized that in a large number of cases in-
definite commitment is unnecessary. Provision should be made for
113 A principal benefit anticipated from the New York Mental Health Information
Service was the development of a procedure for involuntary hospitalization
which did not require judicial intervention prior to hospitalization but never-
theless realistically assured patients of their legal rights. Mental Illness and
Due Process 21-22 (1962). It would not be unreasonable-and would perhaps
be wise-to establish a certification procedure not involving early judicial
participation (such as the Illinois procedure) only if a social service agency
is made available to oversee its administration and to assure procedural regu-
larity.
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short-term intensive treatment on an involuntary basis without indeter-
minate commitment. t 4
Finally, it must be recognized that the implementation of an effective
and fair statutory procedure is only partially a legal problem. It demands,
in addition to well thought out and skillfully drafted statutes the full-time
attention of a professional staff, trained in dealing with the mentally ill.
Where feasible, a full-time social service agency devoted to the provision
of public care and treatment of the mentally ill should be established.
No claim can be made that implementation of these objectives will
"solve" the problems posed by the admission and retention of patients
to mental health facilities. It will, however, provide a statutory frame-
work for the development of a system in which an increasingly knowledg-
able medical profession in cooperation with a sympathetic and informed
bar and community can provide help to the mentally ill without an un-
reasonable sacrifice of individual liberty.
APPENDIX
Admissions to Wisconsin Mental Hospitals: 1960-1965*
The following table is designed to compare the means by which
patients were admitted to state and county mental institutions over a
five-year period.
114A principal problem in the formulation and enforcement of rules in the
area of commitment is the ineffectiveness of supervision by appellate courts.
Because of the non-adversary nature of the usual proceeding, appeals are
seldom taken from actions of trial courts. This has been even more true in
Wisconsin than in many other jurisdictions. But even where such matters
have reached appellate courts, the nature of the underlying problem has en-
couraged the courts to hesitate to exercise their powers of reversal as a
means of enforcing compliance with the statutory procedures. For a refresh-
ingly frank recognition of this attitude see In re Leary's Appeal, 272 Minn.
34, 46, 136 N.W.2d 552, 560 (1965):
[Elven though there are many irregularities in this proceeding which
we do not condone, the evidence does sustain the court's finding that
appellant was mentally ill and that she was in need of hospital care and
treatment. To hold otherwise may lead to appellant's being deprived of
hospital care which she needs. We can hardly believe that all of these
doctors were seeking the commitment of a person who was not mentally
ill and in need of hospital treatment. We cannot see that any good
would come from a reversal because of the technical errors that have
been committed . .. [T]he sole objective of a proceeding of this kind
is to ascertain as best we can whether the person involved is so mentally
ill as to need hospital care. If that fact is established, the decision should
stand unless the patient has been deprived of a right to be adequately
heard.
As a result, it is necessary to rely largely on voluntary compliance with
proscribed procedures and substantive rules by trial courts and hospital per-
sonnel. This makes it of even more importance that the procedures and rules
realistically reflect the problems of the work-a-day world.
* Source: Wisconsin Department of Public Welfare, Basis for Admission of
Patients Admitted to Wisconsin State and County Mental Institutions
for the years covered. All figures are for years ending June 30th of
the year indicated.
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Type of admission
1) temporary detention
without court order
MSH
WSH
County hospitals
Milwaukee
all others
2) temporary detention
with court order
MSH
WSH
County hospitals
Milwaukee
all others
3) voluntary admissions
MSH
WSH
County hospitals
Milwaukee
all others
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
325 370 311 298 488 483
56 42 34 49 86 137
317 325 355 314 275 167
76 100 73 111 114 104
1,167 1,227 1,234 1,364 1,365 1,318
378 439 418 409 353 388
529 592 632 646 621 644
379 384 353 372 372 397
789 769 949 1,088 1,220 1,278
53 61 91 155 208 352
4) temporary observational
commitments (with court
order)
MSH
WSH
County hospitals
Milwaukee
all others
5) indeterminate
commitments
MSH
WSH
County hospitals
Milwaukee
all others
6) transfers from-
(a) juvenile correctional
institutions to
MSH
WSH
County hospitals
160 147 138 141 137 112
100 109 97 96 94 97
460 552 534 442 405 465
37 50 33 88 92 71
228 182 173 139 163 152
466 423 386 389 386 376
5 1 1 1
436 418 427 416 392 329
12 28
1
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7) (b) adult correctional
institutions to
MSH
WSH
County hospitals
Milwaukee
all others
.. . 1 .. .. 1
5 13 6 4 6 13
6 42 6
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